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* s3: mask anonymous misses behind AccessDenied unless the bucket is listable Deferred anonymous GET/HEAD authorization only runs once an entry is selected, so misses returned 404 while existing keys returned 403 — an unauthenticated existence oracle for bucket names and object keys. Route not-found responses in Get/HeadObjectHandler through a check that only discloses 404 when anonymous listing is allowed (policy, identity or a public-read bucket); otherwise the miss is indistinguishable from a denied read, matching AWS and 4.48 behavior. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: mask missing-directory misses for anonymous reads too Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: check a fixed request shape when masking anonymous misses The miss check passed the caller's request through, so query parameters could retarget the resolved action (?policy) or satisfy an s3:prefix condition on an unrelated subtree. Each check now runs on a request with a fixed shape: a ListBucket scoped to the probed key and a plain read of the key, so the miss only shows when the caller could learn the same fact directly. * s3: mask conditional-header misses for anonymous reads An If-Match conditional on a missing key wrote NoSuchKey directly from processConditionalHeaders, before the handlers reached the masked miss path, so anonymous callers could still distinguish a missing key from a denied read. * s3: keep the versionId when masking anonymous misses The read leg must evaluate the action the caller's request resolves to: a versioned miss is s3:GetObjectVersion, and dropping versionId would let a plain GetObject grant disclose versions the caller may not read. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
182 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
182 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/s3"
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"github.com/gorilla/mux"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
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)
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type anonymousObjectReadContextKey struct{}
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// isAnonymousObjectRead identifies requests deferred by AuthWithPublicRead to
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// the selected entry's authorization check. Clients cannot set this marker.
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func isAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request) bool {
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marked, _ := r.Context().Value(anonymousObjectReadContextKey{}).(bool)
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return marked
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}
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// deferAnonymousObjectRead only grants entry-dependent authorization to raw
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// GET/HEAD reads. Subresources, writes and requests carrying credentials keep
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// their normal authentication path; no-auth development mode is unchanged.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) deferAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request, action Action, bucket, object string) (*http.Request, bool) {
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if s3a.iam == nil || !s3a.iam.isEnabled() || action != s3_constants.ACTION_READ ||
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getRequestAuthType(r) != authTypeAnonymous || object == "" || object == "/" ||
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(r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead) || isSOSAPIObject(strings.TrimPrefix(object, "/")) {
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return r, false
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}
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resolved := ResolveS3Action(r, string(action), bucket, object)
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if r.URL.Query().Has("uploads") || (resolved != s3_constants.S3_ACTION_GET_OBJECT && resolved != s3_constants.S3_ACTION_GET_OBJECT_VERSION) {
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return r, false
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}
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// A session token without a signature names no session; drop it so it
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// cannot influence identity or policy evaluation downstream.
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r.Header.Del("X-Amz-Security-Token")
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if q := r.URL.Query(); q.Has("X-Amz-Security-Token") {
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q.Del("X-Amz-Security-Token")
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r.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
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}
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// Reuse authentication's internal-header sanitization. A public ACL does
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// not require an anonymous identity; a configured one still contributes
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// its permissions and explicit identity-policy denies.
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identity, _, _ := s3a.iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
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ctx := recordIdentityInContext(r, identity)
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return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(ctx, anonymousObjectReadContextKey{}, true)), true
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}
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// authorizeAnonymousObjectRead evaluates policies and ACLs against the same
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// entry used for the response, including conditional and versioned reads.
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// Explicit policy denies take precedence over every public-access grant.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) authorizeAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request, bucket, object string, extended map[string][]byte) s3err.ErrorCode {
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// A version's physical filer path is not another S3 key: accepting it would
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// bypass GetObjectVersion policies on the logical key. Ordinary user keys
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// containing ".versions" without internal version metadata are unaffected.
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key := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(object)
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version := string(extended[s3_constants.ExtVersionIdKey])
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if version != "" && strings.HasSuffix(path.Dir(key), s3_constants.VersionsFolder) && path.Base(key) == s3a.getVersionFileName(version) {
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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if string(extended[s3_constants.ExtDeleteMarkerKey]) == "true" {
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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// Loading config also synchronizes a cold bucket policy into the engine.
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config, code := s3a.getBucketConfig(bucket)
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if code != s3err.ErrNone {
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return code
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}
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identity, _ := s3_constants.GetIdentityFromContext(r).(*Identity)
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code, policyAllowed := s3a.checkPolicyWithEntry(r, bucket, object, string(s3_constants.ACTION_READ), buildPrincipalARN(identity, r), extended)
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if code != s3err.ErrNone {
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return code
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}
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if s3a.iam.isActionExplicitlyDeniedByApplicablePolicies(r, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) {
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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if policyAllowed {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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if identity != nil && s3a.iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) == s3err.ErrNone {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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// Match the upload/ACL path: legacy buckets without recorded ownership
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// controls still accept ACLs. An enforced control explicitly disables them.
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if config.Ownership == "" || s3_constants.EffectiveOwnership(config.Ownership) != s3_constants.OwnershipBucketOwnerEnforced {
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if data, exists := extended[s3_constants.ExtAmzAclKey]; exists {
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// An explicitly stored ACL replaces the legacy bucket-ACL fallback.
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// Empty, malformed and non-public ACLs must not grant anonymous read.
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var grants []*s3.Grant
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if json.Unmarshal(data, &grants) == nil {
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for _, grant := range grants {
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if grant != nil && grant.Grantee != nil && grant.Grantee.Type != nil && *grant.Grantee.Type == "Group" &&
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grant.Grantee.URI != nil && *grant.Grantee.URI == s3_constants.GranteeGroupAllUsers && grant.Permission != nil &&
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(*grant.Permission == s3_constants.PermissionRead || *grant.Permission == s3_constants.PermissionFullControl) {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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}
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}
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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}
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// Preserve SeaweedFS's bucket-public-read behavior for legacy objects that
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// have no stored object ACL; BucketOwnerEnforced ignores object grants.
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if config.IsPublicRead {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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// authorizeAnonymousBucketList reports whether an anonymous caller may learn
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// which keys exist in the bucket: bucket listing via policy or identity, or a
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// public-read bucket. Anything else masks the miss as AccessDenied.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) authorizeAnonymousBucketList(r *http.Request, bucket string) s3err.ErrorCode {
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identity, _ := s3_constants.GetIdentityFromContext(r).(*Identity)
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object := mux.Vars(r)["object"]
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// The caller's query parameters would otherwise retarget these checks
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// (?policy resolves to GetBucketPolicy) or satisfy a prefix condition on an
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// unrelated subtree, so each runs on a request with a fixed shape: a
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// ListBucket scoped to the probed key, and a plain read of the key itself.
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// A caller that could learn the key's existence either way — by listing or
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// by getting it — gets the real miss.
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listReq := r.Clone(r.Context())
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listReq.URL = &url.URL{Path: "/" + bucket, RawQuery: url.Values{"prefix": {object}}.Encode()}
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// versionId must survive: a read of a specific version resolves to
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// s3:GetObjectVersion, and dropping it would let a GetObject grant answer
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// for versions the caller may not read.
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readQuery := url.Values{}
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if v := r.URL.Query().Get("versionId"); v != "" {
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readQuery.Set("versionId", v)
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}
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readReq := r.Clone(r.Context())
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readReq.URL = &url.URL{Path: "/" + bucket + "/" + object, RawQuery: readQuery.Encode()}
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principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity, r)
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policyAllowed := false
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code, allowed := s3a.checkPolicyWithEntry(listReq, bucket, "", string(s3_constants.ACTION_LIST), principal, nil)
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if code != s3err.ErrNone {
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return code
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}
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policyAllowed = allowed
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if !policyAllowed {
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code, allowed = s3a.checkPolicyWithEntry(readReq, bucket, object, string(s3_constants.ACTION_READ), principal, nil)
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if code != s3err.ErrNone {
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return code
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}
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policyAllowed = allowed
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}
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if s3a.iam.isActionExplicitlyDeniedByApplicablePolicies(listReq, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST, bucket, "") ||
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s3a.iam.isActionExplicitlyDeniedByApplicablePolicies(readReq, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) {
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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if policyAllowed {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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if identity != nil &&
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(s3a.iam.VerifyActionPermission(listReq, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_LIST, bucket, "") == s3err.ErrNone ||
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s3a.iam.VerifyActionPermission(readReq, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) == s3err.ErrNone) {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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if config, code := s3a.getBucketConfig(bucket); code == s3err.ErrNone && config.IsPublicRead {
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return s3err.ErrNone
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}
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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// writeAnonymousAwareNotFound keeps missing-bucket and missing-key misses
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// indistinguishable from denied reads for anonymous callers: a 404 only
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// reaches the wire when the bucket is anonymously listable.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) writeAnonymousAwareNotFound(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, bucket string, code s3err.ErrorCode) {
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if isAnonymousObjectRead(r) && s3a.authorizeAnonymousBucketList(r, bucket) != s3err.ErrNone {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
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return
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}
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, code)
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}
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