Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_extract.go
T
Chris Lu 268424a5e1 s3: extract zip members on PutObject (#11786)
* filer: add zip archive extraction helpers

SpoolZipReader makes an upload body seekable for archive/zip,
SanitizeZipMemberName rejects zip-slip and non-regular members, and
CheckZipLimits caps member count and total uncompressed size.

For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722

* filer: extract zip members on ?extract=zip upload

POST/PUT to a directory path with ?extract=zip (or X-Seaweedfs-Extract:
zip) writes each archive member as its own entry, so a bundle of small
files lands in one request instead of one roundtrip each. Members keep
their mtime, mode and mime-by-extension; directories are created;
unsafe names are skipped and reported. extract.keep=true also stores
the archive itself.

For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722

* filer: bound zip spool memory by actual bytes

A chunked upload has no Content-Length, so the old size hint let an unbounded body go through io.ReadAll. Read up to the memory threshold plus one byte first, then spill the prefix and the rest to a temp file, capped at ZipExtractMaxBytes total.

* filer: guard zip member size total against overflow

Declared member sizes summing past math.MaxUint64 wrapped the running total and slipped past the 1 TiB cap.

* server: only take the inline fast path at a short first read

uploadReaderToChunks read at most chunkSize bytes, then treated any read below SaveToFilerLimit as the whole file. When SaveToFilerLimit exceeded chunkSize, longer uploads were stored truncated.

* server: resolve storage options per extracted zip member

A member can land under a storage rule more specific than the request path. Re-running detectStorageOption0 per destination applies that rule's collection, replication, TTL, filename limit, and read-only guard to files and directories alike, while explicit query overrides still win.

* server: accept raw request body for POST extract uploads

Every POST was forced through MultipartReader, so a raw zip body always got a 400. Only parse multipart when the Content-Type is actually multipart.

* server: extract zip directories before files and stop on cancel

Processing directory members first keeps their stored mtime/mode from being overwritten by parents auto-created for an earlier file member. Checking ctx.Err() between members keeps a disconnected client from driving thousands more writes.

* server: assert stored mtime and mode for extracted members

* s3: add zip extraction header constants

* s3: extract zip members on PutObject with extract header

x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract or x-seaweedfs-extract: zip on a PutObject fans out the archive to one object per member under the object's directory, reusing putToFiler so chunking, collections, storage rules, versioning, and bucket-default encryption apply to each member. The archive itself is not stored. Explicit SSE request headers are rejected since one encryption config cannot represent independently created member objects.

* s3: bound member fan-out by request cancellation

Stop starting new member writes once the request context is done, matching the filer extract loop.

* filer: bound compressed zip spool and reject non-local member names

The 1 TiB uncompressed limit was also capping the compressed bytes
spooled to the host's temp directory, so a handful of concurrent
extractions could fill the filer's disk before any ZIP validation ran.
SpoolZipReader now takes a separate compressed-size limit (the filer
passes its TUS max upload size) with a 5 GiB default.

SanitizeZipMemberName gains a filepath.IsLocal check: the segment loop
already rejects "..", but CodeQL only treats member names as sanitized
through a recognized guard, and the extra check also covers reserved
Windows names.

* server: honor destination rules for zip members and clamp maxMB

An x-seaweedfs-destination header picks the storage rules for a logical
destination while members still land under the request path, matching
PostHandler. Directory members now also enforce the actual path's
read-only rule instead of relying on option resolution to fail.

maxMB up to 2048 overflowed the int32 chunk size, so an oversized query
value made extraction (and ordinary autoChunk uploads) store members
empty yet report success. The parsing is shared and clamped at 2047 MB.

* s3: scope zip member writes through the per-key checks PutObject applies

The extraction loop bypassed most of what a standalone PutObject would
face: members were written without IAM authorization for their key,
directory members replaced markers without entry lock checks, and lock
headers persisted retention without the s3:PutObjectRetention or
s3:PutObjectLegalHold permissions. authorizeMember now runs IAM,
table-bucket path rules, bucket policy, lock-header validation, and
non-versioned lock enforcement per member key, and directory members
take the same guarded mkdir path as an explicit dir marker.

The archive's own Content-Md5 and x-amz-checksum-* values are verified
while the body spools instead of being silently dropped, members stop
inheriting the archive's Content-Encoding, and non-versioned members
resolve their lifecycle TTL like normal uploads.

* s3: fail malformed lock headers before spooling the archive

Per-member re-validation turned a bad object-lock header into one error
entry per member inside a 200 response. Validate once up front like
PutObjectHandler does, and keep only the dedicated retention/legal-hold
permission checks scoped to each member key.

* filer: return 413 for oversized archives and honor saveInside in extract

Map filer.ErrZipTooLarge to 413 instead of 500 for client-side archive
size violations. Extracted members written under saveInside now store
as inline entry content instead of unreachable volume chunks.

* s3: write extracted members under their own request context

Point member writes at the member key via mux.SetURLVars so SSE-KMS
builds the encryption context from the member ARN, not the archive's.
Map the spool limit error to ErrEntityTooLarge.
2026-10-16 21:07:05 -07:00

348 lines
12 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"crypto/md5"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"hash"
"io"
"mime"
"net/http"
"path"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
func isExtractZip(r *http.Request) bool {
if r.URL.Query().Get("extract") == "zip" ||
r.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSExtract) == "zip" {
return true
}
// AWS Snowball auto-extract: header presence requests extraction.
if v := r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzMetaSnowballAutoExtract); v != "" && v != "false" {
return true
}
return false
}
func hasExplicitSseHeaders(r *http.Request) bool {
return r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption) != "" ||
r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyId) != "" ||
r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm) != ""
}
type extractMemberResult struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Size int64 `json:"size,omitempty"`
ETag string `json:"etag,omitempty"`
}
type extractZipResult struct {
Extracted []*extractMemberResult `json:"extracted"`
Errors []string `json:"errors,omitempty"`
}
// extractZipObject writes a PutObject zip body as one object per member under
// the object's directory, like AWS Snowball's x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract.
// The archive object itself is not stored.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) extractZipObject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, bucket, object string, dataReader io.Reader) {
if hasExplicitSseHeaders(r) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
versioningState, err := s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
if !s3a.handleAutoCreateBucket(w, r, bucket, "PutObjectHandler") {
return
}
versioningState, err = s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
}
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("extractZipObject: versioning state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
}
versioningConfigured := versioningState != ""
r, aclCode := s3a.preparePutObjectACL(r, bucket)
if aclCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, aclCode)
return
}
objectLockEnabled, lockErr := s3a.isObjectLockEnabled(bucket)
if lockErr != nil && !errors.Is(lockErr, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
glog.Errorf("extractZipObject: object lock state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, lockErr)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
// Malformed or unauthorized lock headers fail the request outright, the
// same as a standalone PutObject; per-member permission re-checks happen in
// authorizeMember.
if vErr := s3a.validateObjectLockHeaders(r, bucket, object, objectLockEnabled); vErr != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, mapValidationErrorToS3Error(vErr))
return
}
// Checksums describing the archive body are verified while it spools, then
// scrubbed so members are validated against their own bytes instead.
requestQuery := parseRequestQuery(r)
archiveMd5 := r.Header.Get("Content-Md5")
var archiveMd5Hash hash.Hash
if archiveMd5 != "" {
archiveMd5Hash = md5.New()
dataReader = io.TeeReader(dataReader, archiveMd5Hash)
}
archiveChecksumAlgo, archiveChecksumHeader, checksumCode := detectRequestedChecksumAlgorithmQ(r, requestQuery)
if checksumCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, checksumCode)
return
}
var archiveChecksumHash hash.Hash
expectedArchiveChecksum := ""
if archiveChecksumAlgo != ChecksumAlgorithmNone {
if archiveChecksumHash = getCheckSumWriter(archiveChecksumAlgo); archiveChecksumHash != nil {
dataReader = io.TeeReader(dataReader, archiveChecksumHash)
}
expectedArchiveChecksum = lookupHeaderOrQuery(r, requestQuery, archiveChecksumHeader)
}
scrubArchiveChecksums(r)
// Content-Encoding describes the archive body on the wire; the members it
// fans out to are stored as-is.
r.Header.Del("Content-Encoding")
ra, size, cleanup, err := filer.SpoolZipReader(dataReader, 0)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, filer.ErrZipTooLarge) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), s3err.ErrMsgContentSha256Mismatch) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrContentSHA256Mismatch)
} else {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
}
return
}
defer cleanup()
if errCode := verifyArchiveChecksums(archiveMd5, archiveMd5Hash, expectedArchiveChecksum, archiveChecksumHash); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
zr, err := zip.NewReader(ra, size)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
if err = filer.CheckZipLimits(zr); err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
root := object
if !strings.HasSuffix(root, "/") {
root = path.Dir(root)
}
root = strings.TrimSuffix(root, "/")
if root == "." {
root = ""
}
identity, _ := s3_constants.GetIdentityFromContext(r).(*Identity)
result := &extractZipResult{}
join := func(rel string) string {
if root == "" {
return rel
}
return root + "/" + rel
}
// authorizeMember applies to a member key the same checks a standalone
// PutObject of that key would face: IAM, table layout, bucket policy,
// object-lock header permissions, and existing-entry protections.
authorizeMember := func(memberKey string) s3err.ErrorCode {
if code := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectWrite(r, identity, bucket, memberKey); code != s3err.ErrNone {
return code
}
if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, memberKey); err != nil {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
if code, _ := s3a.checkPolicyWithEntry(r, bucket, memberKey, string(s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE), "", nil); code != s3err.ErrNone {
return code
}
// Lock headers validated for the request still need the dedicated
// permissions against the member's own key.
if r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzObjectLockMode) != "" || r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate) != "" {
if !s3a.checkObjectLockHeaderPermission(r, bucket, memberKey, s3_constants.ACTION_PUT_OBJECT_RETENTION) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
}
if r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzObjectLockLegalHold) != "" {
if !s3a.checkObjectLockHeaderPermission(r, bucket, memberKey, s3_constants.ACTION_PUT_OBJECT_LEGAL_HOLD) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
}
if !versioningConfigured {
if lockErr := s3a.enforceObjectLockProtections(r, bucket, memberKey, "", s3a.evaluateGovernanceBypassRequest(r, bucket, memberKey)); lockErr != nil {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}
writeMember := func(rel string, memberReader io.Reader, memberSize int64) {
memberKey := join(rel)
if authCode := authorizeMember(memberKey); authCode != s3err.ErrNone {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, memberKey+": "+s3err.GetAPIError(authCode).Code)
return
}
memberContentType := mime.TypeByExtension(path.Ext(memberKey))
if memberContentType == "" {
memberContentType = "application/octet-stream"
}
// Write helpers read the object from route vars, e.g. for the SSE-KMS
// encryption context ARN; point them at the member, not the archive.
memberReq := mux.SetURLVars(r, map[string]string{
"bucket": bucket,
"object": memberKey,
})
memberReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", memberContentType)
memberReq.ContentLength = memberSize
var etag string
var errCode s3err.ErrorCode
switch versioningState {
case s3_constants.VersioningEnabled:
_, etag, errCode, _ = s3a.putVersionedObject(memberReq, bucket, memberKey, memberReader, memberContentType)
case s3_constants.VersioningSuspended:
etag, errCode, _ = s3a.putSuspendedVersioningObject(memberReq, bucket, memberKey, memberReader, memberContentType)
default:
filePath := s3a.toFilerPath(bucket, memberKey)
lifecycleTTLSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, memberKey, memberSize)
etag, errCode, _ = s3a.putToFiler(memberReq, filePath, memberReader, bucket, memberKey, 1, lifecycleTTLSec, nil, false, "")
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, memberKey+": "+s3err.GetAPIError(errCode).Code)
return
}
result.Extracted = append(result.Extracted, &extractMemberResult{Name: memberKey, Size: memberSize, ETag: etag})
}
mkdirMember := func(memberKey string) {
if authCode := authorizeMember(memberKey); authCode != s3err.ErrNone {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, memberKey+": "+s3err.GetAPIError(authCode).Code)
return
}
dirPath := s3a.toFilerPath(bucket, memberKey)
dirName, entryName := path.Dir(dirPath), path.Base(dirPath)
// mkdir replaces an existing marker outright, so a lock recorded on the
// entry itself is checked under the same lock the replacement takes,
// mirroring the explicit-directory branch of PutObjectHandler.
markerCode := s3a.withObjectWriteLock(bucket, memberKey, func() s3err.ErrorCode {
if !objectLockEnabled {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
existing, existErr := s3a.getEntry(dirName, entryName)
if existErr != nil {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
if lockErr := s3a.enforceObjectLockOnEntry(existing, bucket, memberKey, "", s3a.evaluateGovernanceBypassRequest(r, bucket, memberKey)); lockErr != nil {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}, func() s3err.ErrorCode {
mkErr := s3a.mkdir(dirName, entryName, func(entry *filer_pb.Entry) {
entry.Attributes.Mime = s3_constants.FolderMimeType
s3a.setObjectOwnerFromRequest(r, bucket, entry)
applyPutObjectACL(r, entry)
if lockErr := s3a.extractObjectLockMetadataFromRequest(r, entry); lockErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("extractZipObject: object lock metadata for %s/%s: %v", bucket, memberKey, lockErr)
}
})
return filerErrorToS3Error(mkErr)
})
if markerCode != s3err.ErrNone {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, memberKey+": "+s3err.GetAPIError(markerCode).Code)
}
}
for _, zf := range zr.File {
if ctxErr := r.Context().Err(); ctxErr != nil {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, ctxErr.Error())
break
}
rel, ok := filer.SanitizeZipMemberName(zf)
if !ok {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, zf.Name+": unsafe member name")
continue
}
if zf.FileInfo().IsDir() {
mkdirMember(join(rel))
continue
}
memberReader, openErr := zf.Open()
if openErr != nil {
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, rel+": "+openErr.Error())
continue
}
writeMember(rel, memberReader, int64(zf.UncompressedSize64))
memberReader.Close()
}
w.Header().Set(s3_constants.SeaweedFSExtractedCount, strconv.Itoa(len(result.Extracted)))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result)
}
// verifyArchiveChecksums compares the archive's supplied Content-Md5 and
// x-amz-checksum-* values against the bytes consumed while spooling. A nil
// hash means the client supplied nothing to check.
func verifyArchiveChecksums(expectedMd5 string, md5Hash hash.Hash, expectedChecksum string, checksumHash hash.Hash) s3err.ErrorCode {
if md5Hash != nil {
expected, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(expectedMd5)
if err != nil {
return s3err.ErrInvalidDigest
}
if sum := md5Hash.Sum(nil); !bytes.Equal(expected, sum) {
return s3err.ErrBadDigest
}
}
if checksumHash != nil && expectedChecksum != "" {
if sum := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(checksumHash.Sum(nil)); expectedChecksum != sum {
return s3err.ErrBadDigest
}
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}
// scrubArchiveChecksums removes request checksums that describe the archive
// body; members are validated against their own bytes.
func scrubArchiveChecksums(r *http.Request) {
isChecksumHeader := func(k string) bool {
k = strings.ToLower(k)
return k == "content-md5" || k == "x-amz-trailer" || k == "x-amz-content-sha256" ||
strings.HasPrefix(k, "x-amz-checksum") || strings.HasPrefix(k, "x-amz-sdk-checksum")
}
for k := range r.Header {
if isChecksumHeader(k) {
delete(r.Header, k)
}
}
query := r.URL.Query()
for k := range query {
if isChecksumHeader(k) {
query.Del(k)
}
}
r.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
}