Files
seaweedfs/weed/security/tls.go
T
Chris LuandDevin e98adfd3bb security: fail closed on gRPC TLS errors, verify dialed server identity (#12263)
* security: fail closed on misconfigured gRPC TLS

LoadServerTLS/LoadClientTLS returned plaintext credentials on every
error path once TLS was configured: a typo in tls.min_version or
tls.cipher_suites, cert and key in different directories, or cert/key
set without grpc.ca all left the component serving or dialing
plaintext. A partially configured TLS setup now stops the process at
startup instead; leaving cert/key unset still means no TLS, as before.

The loaders also stat cert/key/ca files up front since the pemfile
providers read lazily and would otherwise only fail at handshake time.

Mirrored in the Rust volume server: partial grpc.volume cert/key, a
missing grpc.ca, or a rustls build failure now abort startup rather
than warn-and-continue on plaintext.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* security: optional server-identity allowlist for gRPC clients

The mTLS client accepts any certificate the configured CA signs, so a
per-workload CA lets one component stand in for any other: a filer
identity can answer as the master. The server side already screens
callers via allowed_commonNames and allowed_wildcard_domain; nothing
screened the server.

LoadClientTLS now wires AdditionalPeerVerification when the caller
configures a server allowlist: grpc.<component>.allowed_server_commonNames
(falling back to a shared grpc.allowed_server_commonNames) matched
against the peer cert's subject CN, DNS SANs, or URI SANs such as a
SPIFFE id, plus a grpc.allowed_server_wildcard_domain suffix match.
Leaving them unset keeps the previous behavior.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* security: URI SANs are exact-match only in the server identity allowlist

A URI identity whose path happens to end in the wildcard domain would
otherwise pass the DNS suffix check.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* security: tighten gRPC TLS fail-closed and server-identity paths

- URI SANs match the server-identity allowlist exactly; the wildcard
  domain suffix check applies only to CN and DNS SANs.
- A partially set client_cert/client_key pair is an error when the
  cert/key fallback is empty, instead of dialing plaintext.
- Cert/key/ca files are loaded and parsed at startup (LoadX509KeyPair
  and CA PEM validation) since pemfile providers read lazily.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* rust volume: error on a partial grpc client_cert/client_key pair

Mirror the Go loadClientTLS path: when client_cert or client_key is
set without its mate and the cert/key fallback is empty, fail instead
of dialing plaintext.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* security: wildcard domain match requires a valid hostname

A CA-signed identity like ".example.com" satisfied the bare suffix check
for wildcard ".example.com" despite not being a hostname. Require a real
subdomain: non-empty label before the suffix, a '.' boundary when the
configured wildcard has no leading dot, and DNS-name syntax. A leading
"*." label still matches so wildcard certs keep working. Applied to both
the Go server/client authenticators and the Rust volume's client-cert
verifier.

* security: ignore a trailing root dot in wildcard domain matching

* tls: reject a partial dedicated client cert/key pair instead of falling back

When exactly one of component.client_cert/client_key is set, warn-and-
fallback silently dialed with the serving identity. Fail closed like the
other TLS misconfigurations in this change; mirrored in the Rust loader.
Regression tests cover a partial pair with a valid fallback.

* rust volume: harden partial client cert pair test with real pem files

* security: verify dialed server identity per target kind on the filer

The filer reused one grpc.filer-verifying dial option for master, volume,
filer and s3 targets, so a broad allowlist accepted the wrong component at
the wrong port and a narrow one rejected legitimate peers. Outbound calls
now pick grpc.<target>.allowed_server_commonNames (falling back to the
client component's and the global list) while still presenting the
grpc.filer client identity.

* security: scope per-target server allowlists under the client component

The filer read grpc.volume.allowed_server_commonNames when dialing a
volume, but that key already denotes the volume's own outbound allowlist
(e.g. the master identity). A deployment restricting volume->master
calls would make the filer reject real volume servers. Per-target policy
now lives under the client component: grpc.filer.volume_*
falls back to grpc.filer.* then grpc.*.

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-30 20:04:45 -07:00

497 lines
17 KiB
Go

package security
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/security/certreload"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util"
util_http_client "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/http/client"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/tls/certprovider/pemfile"
"google.golang.org/grpc/security/advancedtls"
)
// CredRefreshingInterval is the refresh cadence for gRPC mTLS certs.
// Shares its source of truth with certreload.DefaultRefreshInterval so
// a single WEED_TLS_CERT_REFRESH_INTERVAL env var tunes both gRPC and
// HTTPS cert reload.
var CredRefreshingInterval = certreload.DefaultRefreshInterval
type Authenticator struct {
AllowedWildcardDomain string
AllowedCommonNames map[string]bool
}
// SNIStrippingTransportCredentials wraps another TransportCredentials
// and strips the port from the authority in ClientHandshake to prevent
// advancedtls from using the full "host:port" as ServerName in SNI.
type SNIStrippingTransportCredentials struct {
creds credentials.TransportCredentials
}
func (s *SNIStrippingTransportCredentials) ClientHandshake(ctx context.Context, authority string, rawConn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(authority)
if err == nil {
authority = host
}
return s.creds.ClientHandshake(ctx, authority, rawConn)
}
func (s *SNIStrippingTransportCredentials) ServerHandshake(rawConn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
return s.creds.ServerHandshake(rawConn)
}
func (s *SNIStrippingTransportCredentials) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
return s.creds.Info()
}
func (s *SNIStrippingTransportCredentials) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials {
return &SNIStrippingTransportCredentials{creds: s.creds.Clone()}
}
func (s *SNIStrippingTransportCredentials) OverrideServerName(serverNameOverride string) error {
return s.creds.OverrideServerName(serverNameOverride)
}
func LoadServerTLS(config *util.ViperProxy, component string) (grpc.ServerOption, grpc.ServerOption) {
creds, verify, err := loadServerTLS(config, component)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("gRPC server TLS for %s: %v", component, err)
}
return creds, verify
}
func loadServerTLS(config *util.ViperProxy, component string) (grpc.ServerOption, grpc.ServerOption, error) {
if config == nil {
return nil, nil, nil
}
serverOptions := pemfile.Options{
CertFile: config.GetString(component + ".cert"),
KeyFile: config.GetString(component + ".key"),
RefreshDuration: CredRefreshingInterval,
}
if serverOptions.CertFile == "" && serverOptions.KeyFile == "" {
return nil, nil, nil
}
if serverOptions.CertFile == "" || serverOptions.KeyFile == "" {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s.cert and %s.key must both be set", component, component)
}
if err := checkTLSFiles(serverOptions.CertFile, serverOptions.KeyFile, config.GetString("grpc.ca")); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
serverIdentityProvider, err := pemfile.NewProvider(serverOptions)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("pemfile.NewProvider(%v) failed: %w", serverOptions, err)
}
serverRootOptions := pemfile.Options{
RootFile: config.GetString("grpc.ca"),
RefreshDuration: CredRefreshingInterval,
}
serverRootProvider, err := pemfile.NewProvider(serverRootOptions)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("pemfile.NewProvider(%v) failed: %w", serverRootOptions, err)
}
// Start a server and create a client using advancedtls API with Provider.
options := &advancedtls.Options{
IdentityOptions: advancedtls.IdentityCertificateOptions{
IdentityProvider: serverIdentityProvider,
},
RootOptions: advancedtls.RootCertificateOptions{
RootProvider: serverRootProvider,
},
RequireClientCert: true,
VerificationType: advancedtls.CertVerification,
}
options.MinTLSVersion, err = TlsVersionByName(config.GetString("tls.min_version"))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
options.MaxTLSVersion, err = TlsVersionByName(config.GetString("tls.max_version"))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
options.CipherSuites, err = TlsCipherSuiteByNames(config.GetString("tls.cipher_suites"))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
auther := Authenticator{
AllowedCommonNames: parseAllowedCommonNames(config.GetString(component + ".allowed_commonNames")),
AllowedWildcardDomain: config.GetString("grpc.allowed_wildcard_domain"),
}
if len(auther.AllowedCommonNames) != 0 || auther.AllowedWildcardDomain != "" {
options.AdditionalPeerVerification = auther.Authenticate
} else {
options.AdditionalPeerVerification = func(params *advancedtls.HandshakeVerificationInfo) (*advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults, error) {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
}
ta, err := advancedtls.NewServerCreds(options)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("advancedtls.NewServerCreds failed: %w", err)
}
return grpc.Creds(ta), nil, nil
}
func LoadClientTLSFromFile(configFile string, component string) (grpc.DialOption, error) {
v := viper.New()
v.SetConfigFile(configFile)
if err := v.ReadInConfig(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read security config %s: %v", configFile, err)
}
// Resolve relative PEM paths against the config file's directory.
configDir := filepath.Dir(configFile)
for _, key := range []string{"grpc.ca", component + ".cert", component + ".key", component + ".client_cert", component + ".client_key"} {
p := v.GetString(key)
if p != "" && !filepath.IsAbs(p) {
v.Set(key, filepath.Join(configDir, p))
}
}
return LoadClientTLS(util.NewViperProxy(v), component), nil
}
func LoadClientTLS(config *util.ViperProxy, component string) grpc.DialOption {
option, err := loadClientTLS(config, component, component)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("gRPC client TLS for %s: %v", component, err)
}
return option
}
// LoadClientTLSForTarget builds the component's client dial option while
// selecting the server-identity allowlist for a specific target kind: a filer
// dialing a volume keeps presenting its grpc.filer client certificate but
// verifies the peer against grpc.filer.volume_allowed_server_commonNames. The
// server-name and wildcard keys fall back from the client's per-target key to
// the component key to grpc.*, so a deployment without per-target keys
// verifies exactly as before. The per-target key lives under the client
// component because grpc.<component>.allowed_server_commonNames denotes that
// component's own outbound allowlist.
func LoadClientTLSForTarget(config *util.ViperProxy, clientComponent, targetComponent string) grpc.DialOption {
option, err := loadClientTLS(config, clientComponent, targetComponent)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("gRPC client TLS for %s: %v", clientComponent, err)
}
return option
}
func loadClientTLS(config *util.ViperProxy, component, targetComponent string) (grpc.DialOption, error) {
if config == nil {
return grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()), nil
}
// prefer a dedicated client certificate: CAs may issue certs with only one of the serverAuth/clientAuth EKUs
certFileName, keyFileName := config.GetString(component+".client_cert"), config.GetString(component+".client_key")
partialClientPair := (certFileName == "") != (keyFileName == "")
if partialClientPair {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s.client_cert and %s.client_key must both be set", component, component)
}
if certFileName == "" || keyFileName == "" {
certFileName, keyFileName = config.GetString(component+".cert"), config.GetString(component+".key")
}
if certFileName == "" && keyFileName == "" {
return grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()), nil
}
if certFileName == "" || keyFileName == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s.cert and %s.key must both be set", component, component)
}
caFileName := config.GetString("grpc.ca")
if caFileName == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s cert and key are set but grpc.ca is not", component)
}
if err := checkTLSFiles(certFileName, keyFileName, caFileName); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clientOptions := pemfile.Options{
CertFile: certFileName,
KeyFile: keyFileName,
RefreshDuration: CredRefreshingInterval,
}
clientProvider, err := pemfile.NewProvider(clientOptions)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("pemfile.NewProvider(%v) failed: %w", clientOptions, err)
}
clientRootOptions := pemfile.Options{
RootFile: caFileName,
RefreshDuration: CredRefreshingInterval,
}
clientRootProvider, err := pemfile.NewProvider(clientRootOptions)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("pemfile.NewProvider(%v) failed: %w", clientRootOptions, err)
}
options := &advancedtls.Options{
IdentityOptions: advancedtls.IdentityCertificateOptions{
IdentityProvider: clientProvider,
},
RootOptions: advancedtls.RootCertificateOptions{
RootProvider: clientRootProvider,
},
VerificationType: advancedtls.CertVerification,
}
targetPrefix := ""
if targetComponent != component {
targetPrefix = strings.TrimPrefix(targetComponent, "grpc.") + "_"
}
allowedServerNames := firstConfigString(config,
component+"."+targetPrefix+"allowed_server_commonNames",
component+".allowed_server_commonNames",
"grpc.allowed_server_commonNames")
allowedWildcardDomain := firstConfigString(config,
component+"."+targetPrefix+"allowed_server_wildcard_domain",
component+".allowed_server_wildcard_domain",
"grpc.allowed_server_wildcard_domain")
auther := Authenticator{
AllowedCommonNames: parseAllowedCommonNames(allowedServerNames),
AllowedWildcardDomain: allowedWildcardDomain,
}
if len(auther.AllowedCommonNames) != 0 || auther.AllowedWildcardDomain != "" {
options.AdditionalPeerVerification = auther.AuthenticateServer
} else {
options.AdditionalPeerVerification = func(params *advancedtls.HandshakeVerificationInfo) (*advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults, error) {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
}
ta, err := advancedtls.NewClientCreds(options)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("advancedtls.NewClientCreds failed: %w", err)
}
wrapped := &SNIStrippingTransportCredentials{creds: ta}
return grpc.WithTransportCredentials(wrapped), nil
}
// LoadHTTPClientFromFile creates an HTTP client using the https.client TLS
// settings from the given security config file. Returns nil if HTTPS is not
// enabled in the config. This is used by filer.sync to create per-cluster
// HTTP clients when clusters use different certificates.
func LoadHTTPClientFromFile(configFile string) (*util_http_client.HTTPClient, error) {
v := viper.New()
v.SetConfigFile(configFile)
if err := v.ReadInConfig(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read security config %s: %v", configFile, err)
}
if !v.GetBool("https.client.enabled") {
return nil, nil
}
configDir := filepath.Dir(configFile)
resolvePath := func(key string) string {
p := v.GetString(key)
if p != "" && !filepath.IsAbs(p) {
return filepath.Join(configDir, p)
}
return p
}
return util_http_client.NewHttpClientWithTLS(
resolvePath("https.client.cert"),
resolvePath("https.client.key"),
resolvePath("https.client.ca"),
v.GetBool("https.client.insecure_skip_verify"),
util_http_client.AddDialContext,
)
}
func LoadClientTLSHTTP(clientCertFile string) *tls.Config {
clientCerts, err := os.ReadFile(clientCertFile)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatal(err)
}
certPool := x509.NewCertPool()
ok := certPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(clientCerts)
if !ok {
glog.Fatalf("Error processing client certificate in %s\n", clientCertFile)
}
return &tls.Config{
ClientCAs: certPool,
ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
}
}
// checkTLSFiles validates configured TLS material up front: the pemfile
// providers read lazily, so without this a typo'd or unparseable file would
// only surface at handshake time instead of at startup.
func checkTLSFiles(certFile, keyFile, caFile string) error {
if _, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile); err != nil {
return err
}
if caFile == "" {
return nil
}
caPem, err := os.ReadFile(caFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !x509.NewCertPool().AppendCertsFromPEM(caPem) {
return fmt.Errorf("no CA certificates found in %s", caFile)
}
return nil
}
func parseAllowedCommonNames(commonNames string) map[string]bool {
allowed := make(map[string]bool)
for _, s := range strings.Split(commonNames, ",") {
if s = strings.TrimSpace(s); s != "" {
allowed[s] = true
}
}
return allowed
}
func firstConfigString(config *util.ViperProxy, keys ...string) string {
for _, key := range keys {
if v := config.GetString(key); v != "" {
return v
}
}
return ""
}
// matchesWildcardDomain requires a real subdomain of the wildcard: the name
// must end with the domain, carry a non-empty label in front of it, and be a
// valid DNS name, so a CA-signed name like ".example.com" cannot satisfy the
// suffix check. A leading "*." label is allowed so wildcard certs keep
// matching. One trailing root dot is ignored on both sides so absolute DNS
// names still match.
func matchesWildcardDomain(name, wildcardDomain string) bool {
name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".")
wildcardDomain = strings.TrimSuffix(wildcardDomain, ".")
if wildcardDomain == "" || len(name) <= len(wildcardDomain) || !strings.HasSuffix(name, wildcardDomain) {
return false
}
if wildcardDomain[0] != '.' && name[len(name)-len(wildcardDomain)-1] != '.' {
return false
}
return isDomainName(strings.TrimPrefix(name, "*."))
}
// isDomainName mirrors the Rust volume's check: non-empty labels of letters,
// digits, '-', '_', each up to 63 chars and not '-'-edged, with at least one
// non-digit so a bare IP cannot pass a domain wildcard.
func isDomainName(name string) bool {
if len(name) == 0 || len(name) > 253 {
return false
}
nonNumeric := false
for _, label := range strings.Split(name, ".") {
if len(label) == 0 || len(label) > 63 || label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
if c != '-' && c != '_' && !(c >= '0' && c <= '9') && !(c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') && !(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
return false
}
nonNumeric = nonNumeric || c < '0' || c > '9'
}
}
return nonNumeric
}
func (a Authenticator) Authenticate(params *advancedtls.HandshakeVerificationInfo) (*advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults, error) {
if matchesWildcardDomain(params.Leaf.Subject.CommonName, a.AllowedWildcardDomain) {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
if _, ok := a.AllowedCommonNames[params.Leaf.Subject.CommonName]; ok {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
err := fmt.Errorf("Authenticate: invalid subject client common name: %s", params.Leaf.Subject.CommonName)
glog.Error(err)
return nil, err
}
func (a Authenticator) AuthenticateServer(params *advancedtls.HandshakeVerificationInfo) (*advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults, error) {
leaf := params.Leaf
names := make([]string, 0, len(leaf.DNSNames)+len(leaf.URIs)+1)
names = append(names, leaf.Subject.CommonName)
names = append(names, leaf.DNSNames...)
for _, name := range names {
if a.AllowedCommonNames[name] || matchesWildcardDomain(name, a.AllowedWildcardDomain) {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
}
for _, u := range leaf.URIs {
// URI identities match exactly: a path that happens to end in the
// wildcard domain must not pass the DNS suffix check.
if a.AllowedCommonNames[u.String()] {
return &advancedtls.PostHandshakeVerificationResults{}, nil
}
names = append(names, u.String())
}
err := fmt.Errorf("AuthenticateServer: untrusted server identity %v", names)
glog.Error(err)
return nil, err
}
func FixTlsConfig(viper *util.ViperProxy, config *tls.Config) error {
var err error
config.MinVersion, err = TlsVersionByName(viper.GetString("tls.min_version"))
if err != nil {
return err
}
config.MaxVersion, err = TlsVersionByName(viper.GetString("tls.max_version"))
if err != nil {
return err
}
config.CipherSuites, err = TlsCipherSuiteByNames(viper.GetString("tls.cipher_suites"))
return err
}
func TlsVersionByName(name string) (uint16, error) {
switch name {
case "":
return 0, nil
case "SSLv3":
return tls.VersionSSL30, nil
case "TLS 1.0":
return tls.VersionTLS10, nil
case "TLS 1.1":
return tls.VersionTLS11, nil
case "TLS 1.2":
return tls.VersionTLS12, nil
case "TLS 1.3":
return tls.VersionTLS13, nil
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid tls version %s", name)
}
}
func TlsCipherSuiteByNames(cipherSuiteNames string) ([]uint16, error) {
cipherSuiteNames = strings.TrimSpace(cipherSuiteNames)
if cipherSuiteNames == "" {
return nil, nil
}
names := strings.Split(cipherSuiteNames, ",")
cipherSuites := tls.CipherSuites()
cipherIds := make([]uint16, 0, len(names))
for _, name := range names {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
index := slices.IndexFunc(cipherSuites, func(suite *tls.CipherSuite) bool {
return name == suite.Name
})
if index == -1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid tls cipher suite name %s", name)
}
cipherIds = append(cipherIds, cipherSuites[index].ID)
}
return cipherIds, nil
}