main
36
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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3c34b708b9 |
A mode that does not work stops being on the menu
The control-mode picker offered all five paths to everyone, always. When one of them is broken in a deployment — OCPP is, right now — there was nothing to do about it: the superadmin could pick a different mode for the global layer, but the option stayed in every organization's and every user's dropdown, waiting to be chosen. The cascade could impose a mode. It could not withdraw one. So each layer now carries a second, separate thing: a list of the modes it hides from the layers below it. controlModesDisabled sits beside controlMode, on the global layer as a plugin config field and on an organization as part of the same pluginSettings blob its credentials already live in. A superadmin ticking Own CSMS and Proxy CSMS takes both OCPP paths out of every picker underneath; an org admin ticking Modbus takes it out of their own users'. Three decisions are worth naming. A hide-list governs the layers below, not the layer holding it. The superadmin can keep running Proxy globally while hiding it from everyone else, which is what you want while a mode is being repaired rather than retired: the operator testing the fix is the one person who still needs to select it. The alternative, a list that also invalidates its own layer's choice, would have made the panel contradict itself — a mode chosen in one field and switched off in the one below it. But a hidden mode really is hidden, not merely absent from a dropdown. A user who had picked Proxy last month stops resolving to Proxy the moment the superadmin hides it, and falls back to monitoring only. Filtering the picker alone would have left every existing charger on the broken path and quietly disagreed with the list the operator had just filled in. Resolution now walks the layers accumulating what each hides from the next, so a stored value only takes effect if the layers above it still permit it. And off is never hideable. It is what a charger falls back to and what an empty cascade resolves to, so a layer that could take it away could leave the layer below with a picker holding no valid choice at all. It is not among the checkboxes in any of the three clients, and the parser drops it if it arrives anyway. The panel needed a field shape it did not have — several options, any number chosen — so ConfigField grows a "multiselect" type, stored as the comma-separated string that fits the flat map every other field already uses. That is generic: any plugin can declare one now, and the PUT body is unchanged. The phone's field specs grew the same way, a scopeOptions hook that narrows a declared option list to what the server still offers, rather than teaching the integration card about control modes specifically. Both clients clamp a stored mode that has since been hidden back to off before drawing the picker, so the box shows what will actually happen rather than a choice that would be dropped on save. Verified: Go tests pass, both frontends build, flutter analyze is clean, and the panel's new checkbox field was rendered against the real stylesheet. The end-to-end path — superadmin hides a mode, an org admin and then a user reload and find it gone — has not been walked on a live stack; the panel is embedded in the Go binary, so the remote deployment needs a rebuild before any of this is visible there. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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4d51a34c44 |
The settings card stops emptying when one message is late
A snapshot has two halves and they travel separately: telemetry comes from the trigger, the settings only when the charger has something to say about itself. A read can land with the first and not the second — most often the first read after a reconnect — and the card was seeded from that answer alone, so it collapsed to the one control telemetry happens to carry. That is the state of one message, not the state of the charger. Three things, from the outside in. The card keeps what the charger has reported, per serial, across reads. A value stays until another replaces it. They are its own last word either way, and the same ones the server fills a grouped command's siblings from when a caller leaves them out. A charger that goes quiet is no longer written off for good. The miss counter decides whether a read waits for the settings frame at all, and it only ever rose: three unanswered requests early on and no later read waited again, however freely the charger answered afterwards. The comment said "recently enough"; the code said "ever". Answering clears it now. And the first settings are worth the wait a settings write already gives them. Stale settings and never-reported settings were both allowed four seconds. Stale has something to fall back on; never-reported is the empty card, so it gets the full wait — still bounded by the miss counter, so a charger that truly never answers costs it three times and no more. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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7176867eb3 |
Tap the card on the charger and the number fills itself in
The enrolment the Anker app does, done here: 0108 a2=7 opens the reader, 0908 brings back the UID. The frames this sends are byte-for-byte the ones the app was captured sending — checksum included — which is what the new test asserts. Adding and removing now write the charger as well as the account: the device write is the app's own message, the account write is the inferred one that carries the name, and either may fail without the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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4c73d4ac05 |
0103 writes a card, 0104 asks for the list, 0108 a2=7 opens the reader
Caught on the charger's own command topic while a card was removed and added back in the Anker app. Enrolling at the charger is three MQTT messages and no REST call: open the reader, take the UID the tap publishes, write it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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62b0a29598 |
The reader speaks: 0904 is the card list, 0908 is the tap
Named from a live capture on an A5191: 0904 carried the nine UIDs the account's own card list answers with, and 0908 arrived the moment a card touched the reader, carrying its UID — and arrived without one when the window closed empty. 0911 names the OCPP backend the charger is pointed at. A UID is bytes, not a number, so type 0x04 now reads as hex. With the frame log on, the command topic is subscribed too: the app's own commands are the half no capture has seen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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a7719fca6a |
A line per frame, for the frames nobody has named
ANKER_MQTT_FRAME_LOG logs every inbound cloud frame with its bytes, decoded or not — the ones this package drops are exactly the ones worth naming, so they are logged before the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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245870a96a |
The add and remove buttons, and the read that checks them
Anker documents neither rfid write, so the bodies are inferred from the field names get_device_cards answers with, and every write re-reads the list: what the card shows is what the account holds, never what an undocumented endpoint claimed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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4ff6242c8f |
The last message in the map, and it reboots the charger
0108 was the one thing in the MQTT inventory nobody had wired: the device power mode, whose single documented value restarts the charger. It is the only way to reboot a charger that is on neither a CSMS nor the local network — which is most of them — so the cloud transport sends it now, and "reset" reaches it too, since that is what the OCPP path has always called the same act. Nothing waits for a confirmation: the device that would send it is the device rebooting, so the command answers at once and says the charger drops off the cloud for about a minute. The gate is unchanged and now covers both spellings — an explicit confirm plus a password step-up, audited either way. Modbus still refuses, because no register does this, but its refusal now names both transports that can rather than only the CSMS. Both clients already had the reset button and its password prompt; they were hidden in every mode that reads the device, which is why the cloud never showed one. Modbus is now the only mode without it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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b2d333a63f |
The charger was never asked what it is set to
The trigger buys telemetry and only telemetry, so a charger that has been read a hundred times and commanded none reports amps, volts and nothing else: no schedule, no balancing, no Modbus server, not even its firmware. The message that asks for that half is 0040, and the reference keeps it commented out because the app sends its timestamp without a value type. The app is what the charger answers, so the oddity is reproduced rather than corrected — sent when the settings half is missing or older than ten minutes, waited four seconds for, and after three unanswered requests still sent but no longer waited on. The three settings the panel has and the writer did not — swipe up, swipe down, smart touch — are writable now, which is all eleven of the 0100 commands. Nothing else in the map was missing: every named field of every message was already decoded, and the raw keys the card shows are fields the reference does not name either. Both cards drop a row with nothing in it, which turned a charger that reports only its ceiling into a charger that reports no current range at all. Half a range is still a bound. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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3f9d5b943f |
Four questions asked of an account that answers twenty-one
The connector called ten endpoints of the read surface the map lists, and the charger card showed four views. Everything else an EV charger can reach is now a capability too: the sessions and the history, the savings, the sharing, the binding, the group, the Wi-Fi, the firmware and its update log, the tamper records, the site's own detail, price, networks and energy — plus the vehicle catalogue, dynamic pricing, the currencies and the notification views. Thirty-eight endpoints, one action each. The two message views are GET, so the request path grew a GET half that shares the login retry with the POST one. The per-charger fan-out asks all of them, six at a time rather than one after another, and a charger that belongs to a site brings that site's four views with it once the by-serial lookup has found it. A view that answers with nothing now says so instead of vanishing: the station record is empty for a standalone charger because it has no station, which is an answer worth reading. And "source 0" in the OCPP box carries the address the account's endpoint list gives it. Anker's account-level writes stay out, as do the endpoints whose payloads were only ever read out of the app package. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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1a7f04cba0 |
A dash printed above the value it was missing
The Charger information card read "—" beside State and OCPP status while the raw
block three rows below it printed chargerStatus 1 and ocpp_connect_status 2. The
account had answered both. The merge asked for the state as evChargerStatus,
operating_state or status, which is how the standalone and station views spell
it, and the bound-device view — the one this account actually answers from —
spells it chargerStatus. The OCPP state it never asked that view for at all. All
three views now read through one fillDevice, which tries every spelling a view is
known to use, so a value any of them sends reaches the row that was drawing a
dash for want of it.
The same views were carrying the whole box-on-the-wall half unread: the Wi-Fi
network and its MAC, the signal strength, the Bluetooth MAC, the time zone, when
the account bound the charger, how the app can reach it — BLE, Wi-Fi — and the
product shot for the model, which now sits beside the charger's name in both
apps. Named rows, in three languages, the way the register map's readings are
named.
One field wanted the opposite treatment. The device record carries blue_password,
the charger's own Bluetooth pairing password, and the card was printing it in
clear into every screenshot anyone takes of that page. Any leaf key holding a
password, secret, token, private key or certificate is now masked in the raw
block: that the field exists is worth reporting, its value is not.
Four endpoints answer only when a serial is named, so none of them could belong
to the list the card is drawn from, and nothing had ever called them. The station
record, the charging totals, the OCPP backend and the RFID cards now arrive
through a charger-details capability behind
GET …/anker-solix/chargers/{sn}/details, asked for the charger being looked at,
best effort, each view reporting its own failure — an account that is not the
owner cannot read the cards, which is a fact about the account rather than an
error in the read.
Those four are shown under the cloud's own keys, and that is not an oversight.
The REST map documents which endpoints exist and what each is for; it does not
document a single one of their payloads. Naming those fields is the next commit,
made from what actually comes back, now that there is somewhere to see it.
Not touched: the endpoints the map marks ready but unwired — session history,
site price, OTA, sharing, notifications — each a feature rather than a row on this
card; and the unmapped ones, which the map warns delete sessions and unbind
devices with payloads nobody has ever seen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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8e2073fc4c |
The map knew the names the card was showing as hex
Every field in the cloud MQTT map that has a documented meaning now reads as a named row, on the same labels the register map uses for the same quantities. The raw block stays, and shrinks to what genuinely nobody has identified — which is the only honest reason for a key like 0410.b9 to be on screen at all. Three fields the reference decodes for nobody are decoded here. ac is where the charge is coming from — off or paused, grid, solar — and it is called chargingSource rather than chargingMode, because that name already belongs to a Modbus register and the last time a cloud field borrowed one, d9 spent a release reporting the wrong thing under the right name. b6 is the session's order id. f1, f2 and f3 are the identity fields the reference marks multi-value: four bytes read as the parts of a version, in the order they arrive, which is what the account view's own firmware string looks like. If the panel shows those parts reversed, the order is the thing to flip — it is the one assumption here that the wire has not yet confirmed. The rest was already decoded and simply never drawn. The readings card now shows the session's start, its id, the charging source, whether a cable is in, the charging window, and — since a reading is worth what its age is — the live-stream flag and both stream clocks, because telemetry and settings arrive on different messages with different triggers. Per-phase session energy joins the phase matrix as a fourth column, appearing on the transport that counts a session and staying away from the one that does not, exactly as the reactive and apparent pair does. The settings block gains the fourteen the register map has no address for: plug lock, auto restart, random delay, the schedule and its mode, the weekend window and how the weekend is handled, the light-off schedule and window, the breaker limit, the solar mode and its minimum current, automatic phase switching, the three panel gestures, and what the two balancing features are watching — the meter and monitor serials by name, their two unpinned numbers as the numbers they are. A local network block says whether the charger's own Modbus server is on and where, which is the answer the Modbus mode's setup screen otherwise has to be given by hand. The device block gains the controller version. A test now holds the line the projection quietly drew: every name in the message maps must reach a snapshot field. A name added to a map without a field to land in would otherwise surface in the raw block looking like something we understood. Left raw: a1, the frame opener the charger echoes back; b7, which the map itself calls unidentified; b9, bc and bd, which appear in no map; the five-minute 0400; and 0857 — a message type the reference's closed inventory of fourteen does not contain and this charger publishes anyway. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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2425a8d3d6 |
A field we have no name for is still a field it sent
Two cards on the Charging page were answering with a fraction of what the charger and the account actually report, and in both the losses happened quietly, in a parse that kept the fields it recognised and dropped the rest on the floor. Charger information asked three account-wide views and kept fourteen fields. A charger registered on its own is absent from the site view, which is the only one of the three carrying state, charge power and OCPP status — so exactly the charger that stands alone got the column of dashes, and nothing said why. The per-charger station record, get_evcharger_station_info, is what the mobile app opens when you tap a charger, and it is the one view that answers for a charger outside a station; it is now the fourth view, asked per charger, a failure there costing that charger's row and no more. Alongside it, every field each of the four views sent is kept as attrs, under the cloud's own key, nested objects joined with a dot and arrays carrying their index. First view to answer a key wins, which is the rule the named fields already merged by. Two hundred keys and two hundred and forty runes per value keep a station record with a session list from becoming the whole card. Charger readings lost data twice over. The frame decoder skipped any field byte its per-message map could not name, and a message type with no map decoded to nothing at all; those fields are now kept under the message and the byte they arrived in — 0410.c9 — decoded but unscaled, because a factor is half of a meaning and we do not have the other half. Then the projection read forty-odd names into typed fields and dropped the remainder: sessionStartedAt, the per-phase session energies, the three touch modes, the load-balance monitor and its meter flag, the solar monitor. Those land in extra, and the list maintains itself — the four accessors note every key they read, extra is what is left, and a field modelled later stops appearing there without anyone remembering to remove it. Keeping unnamed fields had one consequence worth guarding. An unmapped message now decodes to something rather than nothing, and ingest stamped settingsAt for anything that was not telemetry — the timestamp a control command waits on to say the charger acknowledged it. A frame we cannot read is not an acknowledgement, so the stamp is now conditional on the message type being one we map, while its fields are kept either way. Both cards show the remainder as what it is: the service's own key, no unit, no translation, no renaming, under a heading that says whose words these are. The blocks appear only when there is something in them, so a Modbus charger's readings card and a charger the cloud says nothing more about are unchanged. Naming one of these fields is a later commit, made from evidence; inventing a label for it today would only make a guess look settled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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90558d60b2 |
What the app can set, the cloud connection can set
The broker transport could move a session along — start, stop, boost, skip the delay, cap the current — and nothing else. Everything the charger is actually configured with sat one field away in the same messages we were already decoding: the schedule it charges on, the plug lock, auto-start, the LED, load balancing, solar charging, and the Modbus server the local transport depends on. Readable, and unreachable. The obstacle was never the cloud, it was the shape of the protocol. A setting is not a register write. It is a *command*, and a command owns a set of fields inside a message type — mostly one, but five own several, and the charger reads the whole command as the new truth. A light-off schedule sent carrying only its switch is a schedule whose start and end have just been set to midnight. So a grouped write resends the siblings the caller did not name, using the values the charger itself last reported, and refuses when it has never reported them. That last part is not caution for its own sake: load balancing and solar charging carry the serial of the meter they watch, and nothing outside the charger knows it. An empty one would be adopted. Those values do not arrive with the telemetry, either. The fast 0410 stream a realtime trigger turns on carries none of them — the settings come on 0405, 0840 and 0900, which the charger sends when it has something to acknowledge. So a grouped write may have to send a trigger first purely to make the charger talk about itself, and says so plainly when even that produces nothing. Everything a caller supplies is encoded before the cloud is touched at all. A request naming one bad value changes nothing rather than half of what it asked for, and a mistyped setting costs a validation error instead of a sign-in, a certificate fetch and a broker connection to be told no. mqttsettings.go holds one table and it is the only place a setting is defined: the wire field, the name a caller uses, the state key its current value comes from, and how a value becomes bytes. The names are the snapshot's own, so a caller can read a status, change one entry and send it back. The existing limit command now builds its frame from that table too rather than encoding field a8 a second time. Reading grew to match. The frame decoder gains the fields the grouped writes must carry back — the two load-balance settings, both monitor serials, the solar monitoring mode — plus the swipe gestures, and the snapshot exposes the rest of what is now writable. One name was wrong and is corrected: field d9 was called chargingMode after the Modbus register at 20088, but the reference has it as the solar charging mode, so it becomes solarChargeMode and moves in beside the solar settings. A mislabelled reading is bad; a mislabelled writable field is worse. Over HTTP it is one action rather than a dozen, because the charger groups the fields anyway: POST .../settings with a settings object, and settings sharing a command travel in one frame instead of overwriting each other. The other two transports refuse it by name and say which one has it, the way they already refuse each other's commands. The audit trail records the values, not just that a write happened — a setting that changes what the charger will draw, or whether it answers on the LAN at all, is worth being able to trace afterwards. Two things worth saying plainly. This is built from the reference project's message maps and checked against its own frame layout, not against hardware — there is no charger on this end to point it at. And modbusEnabled is a loaded gun: writing it off stops the charger serving the register map, and the way back is this transport, or the app. The ignore rule for the local Modbus map artifact widens to the protocol maps that now sit beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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576df58776 |
Go the way the owner's phone already goes
Control had two transports and neither fitted the ordinary customer. OCPP waits for the charger to dial in, which needs a public endpoint it can reach, a certificate, and a firmware willing to talk to our CSMS. Modbus TCP dials the charger, which needs the server on the charger's own network. Between them they cover a charger we host and a charger we stand next to; the common case is a charger behind someone else's router, and that had nothing. It was never unreachable, though. The charger holds a connection open to Anker's own broker — it is how the mobile app drives it from anywhere, and it is the mqttStatus register the Modbus snapshot has been reporting all along. So a third control mode joins that broker as the account: get_user_mqtt_info issues a client certificate, mTLS to aiot-mqtt-eu.anker.com:8883, and commands go out on the same topics the app publishes on. Nothing on the customer's side has to be forwarded, addressed or certificated. What travels is not an API call. The payload is a JSON envelope around a base64 binary frame the device itself speaks — marker, little-endian length, message type, name/length/type/value fields, XOR checksum — so mqttframe.go is a codec rather than a client, written from the message maps in anker-solix-api and anchored on the one frame that project documents byte for byte. A frame whose fields do not tile exactly up to the checksum is refused rather than half-read: these arrive over a link we do not control, and a truncated frame must not read as a charger reporting zeros. Two of the charger's habits shape the rest. It publishes nothing unless asked, so a status read arms a telemetry trigger and waits for the next frame, and a poll inside that window answers from what has since arrived. And a broker connection costs a fetched certificate and a TLS handshake while the plugin manager builds a throwaway instance per request — so the connection lives on the account's shared session beside the auth token, for exactly the reason the token lives there, and closes itself after five idle minutes. The transport also sees two signals no other one does: the boost flag, and the plug and start countdowns. The package doc has said since the first commit that they are never set and the derived mode must do without them. Here they are set, so a charger that has been told to start and is counting down a delay says so rather than sitting in "preparing", and "skip the delay" is offered only while there is a delay to skip. The clients generalise instead of growing a second layout. Both snapshots name the same quantities the same way, so what was Modbus-only in the readouts is now whichever transport read the charger — ModbusStatus becomes ChargerStatus on the phone, mb becomes dev on the web. What each transport can be *told* still differs, and the buttons branch on that: reset and clear-limit stay with OCPP, the timeout and phase registers with Modbus, skip-delay with the cloud. A command a transport has no equivalent for is refused by name, saying which one has it. The cost is worth saying plainly. This leans on Anker's cloud being up and on an unofficial protocol the app may change under us, where Modbus leans on nothing but the LAN. And it is checked against the reference implementation's own worked example rather than against hardware — there is no charger on this end to point it at. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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62cb691f98 |
Everything the register map carries, sorted the way it gets asked about
The Modbus snapshot reported about half of what one poll already brings back. The rest was read into the block and thrown away: line-to-line voltages, reactive and apparent power per phase, the PWM flag, the control-pilot voltage, and the identity block's product number, rated power and current range. All of it now decodes — no extra requests, the registers were in hand already. Added alongside it: the control block, read back over FC03. It answers a question the live registers cannot, which is what the charger is *set* to as opposed to what it is doing — a boost that was asked for reads there while the live block still reports none running. Best effort, so a charger that refuses it still reports its state. Two registers the spec leaves blank are decoded on the hardware's evidence. The control-pilot voltage reads 11873 while the CP signal register reports state A, which that enum names as 12 V, so the register is millivolts. The identity block's current range is in amps, whatever its unit column says about watts and kVA. The charging card lays this out in sections rather than a wall of forty numbers: per-phase measurements as the matrix they are, then live state, then settings, then the device itself, with alarms surfacing only when a word is non-zero. Strings in en/da/pl. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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aaa89dfe10 |
Relays that run at 33 degrees, not 331
The two relay temperatures came back as 331 and 319 from a charger sitting idle with nothing plugged in. The spec's gain column says 1 for both, so we reported them as 331 °C and 319 °C — a reading that would have meant a fire rather than a wallbox at room temperature. The gain is 10. The same table hands the maximum current setting a unit of watts and the timeout a unit of amps, so its unit and gain columns are not load-bearing here; what settles the alignment is the LED brightness two registers earlier, which reads exactly 100 at gain 1, and the fact that the neighbouring registers all decode as tabulated. Read back from the charger afterwards: 33.1 °C and 31.9 °C. The field becomes a float, as the voltages and currents beside it already are. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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cf4fd14b56 |
The table the charger actually keeps its measurements in
Modbus mode never returned a reading: every status poll came back as "the charger did not answer", though the charger was answering all along. It was refusing the question. The A5191 splits its map across two tables where the spec's single 2xxxx column suggests one — 20000-20100 are input registers and reject FC03 with an illegal-address exception at every address in the range, while 21000-21005 really are holding registers and read back over FC03. We inferred one space from the spec's layout and asked for all of it with FC03. The client learns FC04, sharing a body with FC03 since the two differ only in which table the server consults, and the plugin's two measurement reads move to it. Writes stay on FC06, where the controls already live. Confirmed against an A5191 on firmware 1.0.6.1: identity, live block and the control registers all decode as the spec tabulates them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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f7472bada3 |
Reach the charger where it is, instead of waiting for it to call
OCPP asks the charger to dial us: a public endpoint, a TLS certificate, and a route in through the customer's router. Our own handler then demanded two more things the V1 does not offer — TLS on a charger that connects over ws://, and Basic auth credentials the Anker app has no field for — so every connection was turned away before the upgrade. Anker publishes a Modbus TCP register map for this charger, and it inverts the problem: we dial the charger, on its own network, with no inbound reachability to arrange. That works for a charger behind a router that OCPP cannot reach at all. internal/modbus is the protocol, hand-rolled against the spec like the MQTT and WebSocket clients beside it. The plugin's modbus.go is the V1's map: the same 0-8 status enum the cloud already reports, per-phase measurements, and the writable registers behind start, stop, current limit, boost and phase mode. A new "modbus" control mode routes the existing control endpoints down it, so the REST surface, the rate limit, the confirmation step and the audit trail are the ones already there. The commands the register map has no equivalent for say so by name rather than failing as unknown, and a current below the charger's 6 A floor is refused because it pauses the charge rather than slowing it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
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190ae923a6 |
The Anker token outlives the request that fetched it
The manager builds a throwaway plugin instance for every per-user call —
HealthCheckWith, InvokeWith, InvokeBatchWith each construct, Init, probe and
Shutdown. The auth token lived on that instance, so it died with the HTTP request
that fetched it: opening the Anker panel signed in once for the health probe and
again for the charger list, and a page that also asked for OCPP info signed in a
third time. Every refresh, a fresh login.
Anker throttles passport/login per IP per minute and answers code 26161 ("Failed
to request.") once tripped, so this is the shape of the failure the panel has been
reporting; the cloud has also historically kept one token per account, so each of
those logins could evict the one the mobile app was holding.
Tokens and the login backoff now live in a package-level session keyed by the
account signing in, so every instance configured for that account shares one
login. Re-configuring the same credentials keeps the token; a different account,
or the same account on the other regional server, gets its own session. Sessions
unused for a fortnight are pruned, so an edited password does not leave its entry
behind for the life of the process.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
c1aee0fac1 |
One refused sign-in, not five: the chargers poll no longer locks the account
A chargers poll asks four cloud views. Each called apiRequest, each found no token, and each ran its own login — so a login Anker refuses was offered four times in one poll, and the next poll spent the fifth. Five is what disables the account for ten minutes, which is how "code 26161: Failed to request." turned into "your account has been disabled" on the very next attempt. The plugin now remembers a refused login instead of repeating it: the failure is cached and replayed to every caller until a backoff window passes — a minute at first, doubling to fifteen, or the full ten minutes when Anker says it has already locked the account (code 10019). New credentials clear it, so a fixed password is tried at once. chargerInventory signs in once up front. A login the cloud refuses is not four views failing, so it is reported as itself rather than as three warnings with the lockout notice buried in the last one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
a809980d8b |
Anker health: count the chargers the panel lists, not the ones one endpoint admits to
The probe still asked get_user_bind_and_not_in_station_evchargers and read its userBindEvChargersCount, so it reported "0 EV charger(s) bound to account" for an account whose two chargers the panel was listing directly underneath — the same blind spot the capability was just moved off, left behind in the health check. It now takes the same inventory the chargers capability returns and counts that. Authenticated with nothing on the account is degraded rather than ok, following Greencell's rule: the half we address answers, and the empty half is the account or the country that picks the regional server, so the message says so instead of reporting a healthy connection to nothing. A count reached with some view missing says how many views stayed silent, because the number is then a floor rather than a total. The web panel colours degraded amber, as it already did for Greencell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
e138fad3f4 |
Anker: every charger on the account, not just the ones outside a station
get_user_bind_and_not_in_station_evchargers is the only list the connector ever asked for, and its name says exactly what it withholds. A charger that belongs to a system is not in it. Its userBindEvChargersCount, though, counts every charger bound to the account — so an owner with two chargers in a system got "authenticated; 2 EV charger(s) bound to account" from the health probe and an empty list from the capability that is supposed to show them. A working login that finds nothing. So the capability now asks every view the cloud has and merges them by serial. The standalone list still answers for chargers standing on their own; get_site_list walks the systems and reads each one through get_scen_info, falling back to get_system_running_info where that is silent — the power-service / HES split charger-state already knows; and get_relate_and_bind_devices contributes model, firmware and the Wi-Fi flag, and discovers anything in the A519 family that the first two missed. Whichever way a charger was registered, one of the three has it. The merge is first-writer-wins per field rather than last view overwriting: the standalone record knows the name, the site record knows the live state, and neither should blank what the other established. A view that fails is a warning on the document instead of an error on the call, because one dead endpoint should not cost the chargers the other two found. Only losing all three is a failure. When nothing comes back at all the response says so in its own words and names the remaining suspect — country picks the regional server, and the wrong one authenticates happily and shows an empty account. The other half of "not showing any chargers" was that neither client ever showed a list. The serial was a text box, and the number is printed on a charger hanging on a wall. Both apps now list what the account holds — name, serial, model, site, state, an offline badge — and hand the serial to the OCPP control card instead of asking anyone to go and read it. Where control is off the list still stands on its own, as the answer to the first question an owner has after entering credentials. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
a7cab50e06 |
Apprise: a gateway to hand a message to, not a hundred protocols to carry
Apprise is a Python library that speaks 100+ notification services behind one URL grammar — mailto://, tgram://, ntfy://, discord://. None of that is portable to a server that takes no dependencies, and none of it needs to be: caronc/apprise-api wraps the library in HTTP and is meant to run as a container beside us. So the connector carries no notification protocols of its own. It posts a body to an endpoint the operator runs and lets Apprise fan it out, which is also why adding a service later costs nothing here. Targets are addressed one of two ways and configKey is the switch. Stateful means the URLs live on the Apprise server under a key, narrowed by a tag expression, and recipients are then edited there — no credential for any downstream service is ever held in DriverVault. Stateless means the URLs travel with the request, from a secret config field, which is simpler for one destination and worse for ten. A call that names its own key or urls takes that destination alone rather than merging with the configured one: honouring a caller's URLs while still falling back to the configured key would deliver the message somewhere nobody asked for. baseUrl is Required, which no other connector's address is. Toyota, Anker and Greencell leave everything blank at the global layer because the superadmin → org → user cascade exists to fill it in, and a blank there means "let the user choose". There is no cascade behind this one — a notification gateway is infrastructure the operator runs, not an account a driver owns — so nothing further down can supply the address, and a blank is simply a plugin that cannot work. Better to fail at enable than at the first notification nobody sees. Three limits are choices rather than gaps. /add and /del are not implemented: the Apprise config belongs to the operator, we post to it, and a connector that can delete a notification config has a wider blast radius than one that can only send through it. privacy=1 is forced on /json/urls rather than offered as a parameter, so a target listing reads mailto://user:****@host and downstream tokens stay on the Apprise side of the wire. Attachments are remote URLs the Apprise server fetches; multipart upload is the API's own path for files and not ours. Health follows the rule Greencell set. A reachable server whose config holds nothing to notify is degraded, not down: the half we address works and the missing half is the operator's config. Two cases earn their own line — a config key set against a server running with stateful mode disabled can never resolve, and /status answers 417 rather than 500 when Apprise finds a problem with itself, so that is a parsed answer and not a transport failure. A proxy that strips our Accept header gets the same codes back as plain text, which is read rather than called unreadable; an HTML error page from something that is not Apprise is not, and a test pins the difference. Notifications needed a category of their own, and that is the one change outside the plugin: the constant, the tab order in PluginsCard.vue, and the label in all three panel languages. The cost is now written down in the plugins README beside the Descriptor example, since the previous five categories predate anyone having to add a sixth. The plugin's tests run against an apprise-api stand-in built from that project's views.py — both notify paths, the override rules, 204-as-empty against 424-as-failure, and every health branch. builtin_test.go is the other half: the blank-import list in builtin.go is a silent failure mode, since a connector left out of it compiles, passes its own tests, and never appears in the panel. What is not covered is a live instance; there is no Docker on this machine, so the wire contract comes from reading upstream's source rather than from running it, and a smoke test against a real deployment is still worth doing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
e648634ce1 |
The plugin list, grouped by what a plugin actually is
Category has been in the plugin contract since it was written — apis-external, drives-external, drives-local — and every builtin declared the same one, so it grouped nothing. Two of the three talk to a wallbox and one talks to a car manufacturer, and those are different questions an operator arrives with: the Toyota card is where a driver's account gets linked, the Anker and Greencell cards are where a charger's broker and credentials live. So vehicles and chargers join the constants and the three builtins say which they are. The panel groups on that field rather than on a list of names, which is what keeps an external plugin from needing panel code. Tab order mirrors the constants; a category with nothing in it gets no tab, and a single group hides the bar entirely, so an install with one connector looks exactly as it did. A category the panel does not recognise — or an empty one — falls to the external-APIs tab rather than vanishing, because a plugin nobody can see is a plugin nobody can disable. The selected tab falls back to the first group when its own goes away, which is what removing the last external plugin does. Registration still asks only for name, base URL and provider, so a plugin registered at runtime lands under Other APIs until its manifest names a category. That path already works and is the honest default: the panel is guessing about a service it has never spoken to, and the service can say. The header lockup is the other half. It was a copy of the Web App's mark rather than the same mark, and copies drift — a 32px icon against 28, a 24px wordmark against 21.6, "Driver" at text-strong instead of white, "Vault" a step lighter than brand-400. The Web App's Logo.vue moves in verbatim, props included. The one thing it cannot inherit is which variant to render: the Web App's rail is always dark, while this panel flips with its own theme toggle, so on-dark is bound to the theme and the hand-rolled bar fills that existed to survive that flip are gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
340a81b0d6 |
Greencell: the charger on your own broker, not a cloud it never had
The HabuDen has no cloud API to connect to. It is commissioned over Bluetooth in
the Greencell GC app, pointed at an MQTT broker the owner runs, and from then on
publishes there — so the connector is an MQTT client rather than an HTTP one,
and nothing in it reaches Greencell. The wire contract is Home Assistant's own
greencell component and the greencell_client 1.0.3 library beneath it, which is
the only published description of the topics: a BROADCAST on /greencell/broadcast
draws device announcements, and /greencell/evse/{sn}/ carries current in
milliamps, voltage, power under "momentary", the EVSE state, and the access level
chosen in the app.
That meant an MQTT client, and the server takes no dependencies, so internal/mqtt
is hand-rolled the way internal/ocpp's RFC 6455 layer is. It is scoped to what
this connector needs and says so: QoS 0 for everything we send, clean session,
no reconnect — a connection lives for one plugin call, which is exactly how the
manager builds and tears down an instance. Inbound PUBLISH is accepted at QoS 0,
1 and 2 with the acknowledgements each requires, because the QoS of a delivery is
the broker's choice and not ours; an unacknowledged QoS 1 is redelivered forever.
Read-only, and the reason is worth writing down rather than rediscovering. A
device in EXECUTE mode accepts START, STOP, SET_CURRENT and QUERY — but the topic
those go to appears in no source: not Greencell's integration page, not
greencell_client, and Home Assistant ships sensor-only for that same reason.
Publishing to a guessed topic would be a control feature whose failure mode is a
driver believing they stopped a charge. So the access level is reported, and
commandTopic is the seam: an operator who has watched their own broker and found
theirs sets it, and a state read then sends QUERY — the one command a READ-mode
device also honours — instead of waiting out the charger's publish cadence. The
day the topic is public, control is a payload away from the same field.
What the cascade resolves here is a broker, not an account, so host, port, TLS and
credentials resolve together from the highest layer that names a host: an
organization's address paired with a user's password would address a broker with
credentials never meant for it. The serial, the QUERY topic and the listen window
each describe the charger rather than the endpoint, so each resolves on its own.
Two reading rules the tests pin. A phase the device did not report stays nil
rather than zero, because zero amps on a charger is a real measurement — a JSON
null decoding to 0.0 was a live bug until a test caught it — and a partial read
returns with received/complete flags instead of failing, since a device that
publishes some topics on a slower cadence is still worth reading. And a reachable
broker with no charger on it is degraded, not down: the half we configure works
and the missing half is the device. The plugin's end-to-end tests run against an
in-process broker written to the raw wire format, so a bug in the client cannot
hide behind a matching bug in the fixture.
The apps get the third connector card. The panel needed nothing — it renders a
plugin's ConfigFields itself — but the per-user panes are still hand-written per
integration, which is now three near-copies and the argument for the generic
version already noted in the plugins README. The web form splits the broker from
the charger because the server resolves them differently. The phone card is a
declarative config against the shared widget, which gained a number field type, a
degraded state that reads amber rather than red, and a fix for a locked field
that was covering its own displayed value with dots. Twenty keys in three
languages across both apps; Greencell, HabuDen and the literal QUERY join the
proper nouns that stay in English.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
5e6b8b4b1c |
Anker Solix: the charger's mode, and the modes it can be moved into
The connector was written against anker-solix-api v3.7.0 and upstream is at 3.8.1 now. The reassuring half of the check first: nothing we depend on moved. The passport/login ECDH exchange, the headers, and every endpoint path this plugin calls are identical across v3.7.0...v3.8.1 — the only apitypes movement touching an EV charger was get_device_rfid_cards being reordered within its own dict. The 400 new lines in charger.py are the A2345 USB charger, which shares a filename with our device and nothing else. What did land for the V1 is two entries in the release notes, and both are MQTT: 3.8.0 gave standalone chargers the usage-mode entity they were missing, 3.8.1 added a switch that reads those modes as a plain on/off so EVCC and its like have a binary to hold. We control chargers over OCPP, not MQTT, so the command path is not ours to port. The reading of state underneath it is, and that half does come over the cloud. So charger-state. The status code arrives under two different names depending on which system family a site belongs to — operating_state inside a scene's charging_pile_list, evChargerStatus inside HES system running info — and upstream's poller quietly renames both to ev_charger_status on ingest, which is the tell that they are the same number. We ask both and merge, because a site answering only one of them is the normal case rather than a fault; the call fails only when neither view is there. chargerMode and chargerModeOptions then follow ev_charger_mode_state and ev_charger_mode_options as written, including the rule that a stopped charger is startable only from standby, and the binary is the same one 3.8.1 chose: everything that is not stop_charge counts as on. The gap worth naming is that the boost flag and the plug and start countdowns reach upstream over MQTT and never over the cloud, so three of the six modes cannot occur here. That is not a bug to be found later — chargerMode takes them as parameters and the callers pass their zero values, so the day an MQTT source exists the derivation is already correct and only its inputs change. The package doc says so in the scope list beside the other limits. Five endpoints upstream has had all along and we never exposed come with it, all EV-charger-scoped: the site scene, energy_analysis under device_type ev_charger, a charger's RFID cards, Anker's own OCPP endpoint list, and one vehicle's details. charger-status takes the featuretype it was hardcoding at 1, since upstream's exporter asks for both 1 and 2 and there was never a reason for us to see only half. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
22a22ec43a |
Toyota: the status route the car answers, not the one it retired
Toyota put the /v1/global/remote read routes behind AWS SigV4 in mid-2026. A bearer token is no longer a credential there, so the doors-and-windows card has been asking a gateway that answers 403 — the one section of the provider tab that could only ever have been in error. The MyToyota app reads that state from /v1/vehicle/status now and pytoyoda followed it in 5.2.0; so does the connector. The electric route did not move, and the comment above the endpoint block says which of the two namespaces each one lives in, because the obvious tidy — sweep the rest onto /v1/vehicle/* — would break the ones that still work. The same migration gave the climate reads a home worth porting: /v1/vehicle/ climate-status is what the cabin is doing, climate-settings the preset it was told to do it at. Both are GETs with a vin, both are new cards on the tab, and their headings are in all three languages on both apps. Nothing about the tab's plumbing changed to hold them — a section is an id, an action, and whatever JSON comes back, which is the point of that shape. Left where they are: the POST wake calls. Upstream refreshes a stale reading by waking the modem, and this connector is documented as read-only, so climate and status show what the car last reported rather than what it would say if asked twice. The cost is a reading that can be hours old, and it is the honest one to pay for a connector that promises not to touch the vehicle. Two tests keep the migration from being undone by hand: one fails if any advertised capability points back at a retired route, the other if a capability is advertised without being wired into Invoke, which is the way the next endpoint would go missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
ee4ac441be |
Plugins: drop the plugins.json migration, and the volume it needed
The project has no public installs, so there is nothing to migrate from. MigrateLegacyFile, the file-backed Store it read through, PLUGINS_FILE and the legacy path threaded through the Server all go. What is left is one store, PocketBase, and a plugins package that touches no filesystem at all. That was the last thing keeping api_data alive, so the volume goes too. All four compose files now declare exactly one volume, pb_data, and the standalone API Server compose declares none - it talks to an external PocketBase and has nothing of its own to keep. Backing up the stack is backing up one path again. Both images get simpler for it. The API Server image loses VOLUME /data and the su-exec entrypoint that existed only to fix a mounted volume's ownership, so it goes back to a plain USER app; its working directory is now /app and holds nothing. The AIO image loses its second volume and chowns only /pb/pb_data. One consequence worth stating plainly, because it is a small regression rather than a no-op. The panel's Settings -> PocketBase and Settings -> Web App screens write .env in the working directory, which is now ephemeral. In the multi-container stack that changes nothing: compose sets all five of those keys as container environment, and loadDotEnv only applies a key that is not already set, so the file could never win a restart there anyway. In the AIO image it did win for POCKETBASE_ADMIN_EMAIL/_PASSWORD, which are not in that container's environment - so a service account fixed from the panel now lasts only until the container is recreated. Both READMEs say so. Moving those two screens into the app_settings singleton would close it properly; the PocketBase URL and credentials cannot follow, since they are how the database is reached in the first place. go build, go vet and go test ./... pass; the compose files parse and each resolves to a single pb_data volume. Not verified: no Docker CLI here, so neither image was built. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
|
9bd5c523c4 |
Plugins: the global layer moves into the database, beside the other two
The integration cascade stored its top layer differently from the two below it: org (L2) and user (L3) plugin config lived in PocketBase, in a pluginSettings field, while the global (L1) layer sat in a plugins.json next to the binary. That split was accretion rather than design - the file was the whole store in the v1 MVP, and the per-tenant layers were later built on PocketBase and layered on top of it instead of replacing it. It also cost something real. plugins.json was a second state store with different durability from pb_data: its own volume, its own ownership, its own backup. Losing pb_data is unmissable; losing api_data was silent, which is how "every plugin comes back disabled after a redeploy" happened. L1 now lives in the app_settings collection - one record keyed "global", holding its settings in a pluginSettings field, the same mechanism and the same field name the layers below use. The documents still differ in shape, because only L1 carries enable state and the registration of external plugins, but the storage is no longer a special case. The Manager grows a Store seam (PocketBase in production, file for the import, memory for tests) and, more importantly, a loaded gate. Settings in a database mean the store can be unreachable at boot - a cold stack, or a service account still to be set from the panel. That must not read as "no plugins configured", or the first save would write emptiness over real settings. So until a read succeeds the Manager stays unloaded, every mutation is refused, /api/admin/plugins* answers 503, and a background retry backs off to two minutes. The same gate covers a document that will not parse: it is never replaced by one built from an empty map, which is a stronger guarantee than the .corrupt backup it replaces. Writing to a store also revealed a hole in the previous fix. Classifying a save failure as errPersist was left to each Store, and a store that returned a plain error would fall through to the "saved, but the plugin failed to start" branch and be reported as a 200 - the same silent-success bug through a different door. The Manager now classifies, whatever the Store returns; a test pins it. Upgrades are automatic: on the first boot that finds no settings in the database, an existing plugins.json is imported and renamed to plugins.json.migrated. The import is refused if the store is merely unreachable, or if the file does not parse, so a stale or broken file can never overwrite live settings. /data is still needed - the panel rewrites .env there when it retargets PocketBase - but plugin settings no longer depend on it. 21 tests in internal/plugins cover both stores, including the production path against a fake PocketBase: create-then-update of the singleton, round-trip across a restart, an outage that leaves settings intact, a missing collection reading as not-ready rather than empty, and the import running exactly once. go build, go vet and go test ./... pass. Schema changes are mirrored into scripts/setup-pocketbase.mjs as that file requires. Not verified: no Docker CLI here, so no image was built and the bootstrap of app_settings against a real PocketBase is untested outside the fake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
1e76c2b7f9 |
Refresh docs and fix Docker builds for current layout
READMEs: correct the auth model (PocketBase token relay, not JWT/sessions), document the full feature set (technical checks, fuel, maintenance, documents, reminders, attachments, integrations, OCPP charging control), the shipping built-in connectors (toyota, anker-solix), and the current endpoint surface. Docker: build against the current repo layout — Go 1.26, cmd/server entry point, Web App source under web/. Add the missing Web App Dockerfile (Go BFF) and .dockerignore, drop the obsolete AUTH_SECRET, modernise CORS var naming, and standardise on drivervault-* naming. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
a1519f6e89 |
Add OCPP control for the Anker Solix EV charger (Own/Proxy CSMS)
The Anker Solix connector was read-only (cloud monitoring only). Add an
OCPP 1.6J control path with a per-user, cascading control mode:
- off monitoring only (default, unchanged behavior)
- own DriverVault is the charger's Central System (full control)
- proxy DriverVault relays to Anker's cloud and injects commands
New internal/ocpp subsystem (stdlib-only, hand-rolled RFC 6455): a CSMS
with session management, inbound dispatch, and typed control commands
(RemoteStart/Stop, SetChargingProfile current limit, ChangeAvailability,
Reset, UnlockConnector, TriggerMessage, Get/ChangeConfiguration). Own- and
proxy-mode paths are verified end-to-end against a simulated charge point.
The charger connects to /ocpp/{serial}, authenticated with OCPP Basic auth
(serial + a per-charger control token) resolved to the owning user via an
in-memory token index. Control REST endpoints mirror the monitoring ones and
reuse the same cascade gate plus a live-session check. controlMode is a new
cascade field (global -> org -> user) advertised as a select on the plugin.
Frontend: control-mode select + provisioning card in Settings, and a real
Start/Stop/limit/reset control panel in Charging, gated on the active mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
0793b5ec8e |
Add a built-in Anker Solix V1 Smart EV Charger plugin
A Go re-implementation of the auth and read-only data flow from thomluther/anker-solix-api, scoped to the V1 Smart EV Charger (A5191) and adapted to DriverVault's plugin contract. Login is a custom ECDH (P-256) + AES-256-CBC password exchange against passport/login, yielding a ~7-day auth token plus gtoken = md5(user_id) for subsequent requests; a fresh login covers expiry and 401/403. The country code routes to the EU or global Anker server. Exposes read-only capabilities (chargers, charger-status, charge-stats, charge-orders, ocpp-info, devices, sites, vehicles) with a health check that reports the bound-charger count. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
5e435c5f77 |
Add per-user Toyota integration with a settings cascade
Let each user run the Toyota Connected plugin under their own MyToyota
credentials and enable/disable it for themselves in the Web App, while a
superadmin (and, in an organization, an org admin) can impose settings
from above. Resolution is a cascade — top wins, and a lower level only
fills fields the levels above left blank:
- org user: API Server (superadmin) -> org admin -> user
- org-less user: API Server (superadmin) -> user
The MyToyota email + password resolve together as a pair from the highest
layer that supplies an email; brand resolves on its own; enablement is
strictly per-user, gated by the global master switch and the org gate.
API Server:
- plugins.Manager gains RawConfig / HealthCheckWith / InvokeWith so the
cascade can read global config and probe/invoke under a per-caller
resolved config.
- internal/api/integrations.go resolves the cascade and serves
GET/PUT /api/integrations/toyota, POST .../health, GET .../vehicles.
Secrets and inherited usernames are masked before leaving the server.
- The toyota builtin's credentials are no longer required at the global
layer, so the master switch can be enabled without global credentials.
- setup-pocketbase.mjs adds a pluginSettings JSON field to the users and
organizations collections (the user and org layers of the cascade).
Web App:
- api.js gains getToyota/saveToyota/testToyota.
- Settings grows an Integrations section: an enable toggle, credential
fields with locked / "inherited from" states, a brand select, an
org-scope switch for admins, and a live test-connection button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
5a729abd71 |
Add a built-in Toyota Connected Europe plugin
Port pytoyoda's authentication and read-only data flow to a Go builtin plugin behind the existing plugin contract. Implements the three-legged ForgeRock/OAuth2 login (authenticate callback loop, authorize, token exchange), silent refresh with full re-auth fallback, and the full Toyota gateway header set with backoff on 429/5xx. Exposes read-only capabilities: vehicles, telemetry, location, health, status, electric, notifications, and service-history. Config takes a MyToyota email/password and a Toyota/Lexus brand select. Europe-only and read-only, matching pytoyoda's limitations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8
|
ae6ed4ac1e |
Rebuild API Server on the PilotVault structure
Mirror PilotVault's API Server layout and add the superadmin console,
plugin system, runtime PocketBase settings, and user/organization
management. The car domain (cars, service records, parts, sharing) is
carried over unchanged apart from the auth switch.
Layout: main.go -> cmd/server/main.go; module carcontrol/api ->
drivervault/apiserver. internal/api is split by concern (auth, users,
orgs, settings, plugins, status, health, respond).
Auth: replace the server-minted HS256 JWT and the sessions collection
with a PocketBase token proxy. /api/auth/login relays PocketBase's
{token, record}, and every protected request re-resolves that token
against PocketBase, so a role change or deletion takes effect at once
instead of waiting out a token. AUTH_SECRET is obsolete and internal/auth
is gone. Per-device session listing/revocation goes with it: PocketBase
tokens are stateless. Changing a password rotates the user's token key,
which invalidates every token already issued.
Roles: add superadmin alongside user/admin, plus an organizations
collection and users.organization. Admins are scoped to their own
organization; superadmins span all of them. Guards prevent changing your
own role, deleting your own account, an admin touching a superadmin, and
deleting an organization that still has members.
Plugins: new internal/plugins package with one contract over two kinds --
builtin (compiled in) and external (any HTTP service, registered at
runtime with no rebuild). State persists to plugins.json; secrets are
masked on read and preserved when saved back at the mask.
PocketBase settings: /api/admin/pb-config applies a new connection at
runtime and persists it to .env. It deliberately does not require a
working service account, so a wrong or unreachable connection can still
be fixed from the panel.
Panel: rebuilt as the superadmin console -- login gate, status, users,
organizations, PocketBase, plugins, and the endpoint reference.
Clients: update the Web App and Phone App for the PocketBase token shape,
the move of user management to /api/users ({users}/{user} envelopes, with
password resets folded into PATCH), and the removal of sessions. Both now
mirror the server's real guards rather than the old last-admin rule, and
parse PocketBase's field-level error shape.
Config: modern POCKETBASE_*/API_ADDR names with legacy PB_*/PORT
fallbacks, so existing .env files keep working. Also fixes /api/status
probing the Web App on 8090 instead of DriverVault's 5173.
Run scripts/setup-pocketbase.mjs to add the organizations collection and
grow users.role; every client must log in once more.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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