Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 2425a8d3d6 A field we have no name for is still a field it sent
Two cards on the Charging page were answering with a fraction of what the charger
and the account actually report, and in both the losses happened quietly, in a
parse that kept the fields it recognised and dropped the rest on the floor.

Charger information asked three account-wide views and kept fourteen fields.
A charger registered on its own is absent from the site view, which is the only
one of the three carrying state, charge power and OCPP status — so exactly the
charger that stands alone got the column of dashes, and nothing said why. The
per-charger station record, get_evcharger_station_info, is what the mobile app
opens when you tap a charger, and it is the one view that answers for a charger
outside a station; it is now the fourth view, asked per charger, a failure there
costing that charger's row and no more. Alongside it, every field each of the
four views sent is kept as attrs, under the cloud's own key, nested objects
joined with a dot and arrays carrying their index. First view to answer a key
wins, which is the rule the named fields already merged by. Two hundred keys and
two hundred and forty runes per value keep a station record with a session list
from becoming the whole card.

Charger readings lost data twice over. The frame decoder skipped any field byte
its per-message map could not name, and a message type with no map decoded to
nothing at all; those fields are now kept under the message and the byte they
arrived in — 0410.c9 — decoded but unscaled, because a factor is half of a
meaning and we do not have the other half. Then the projection read forty-odd
names into typed fields and dropped the remainder: sessionStartedAt, the
per-phase session energies, the three touch modes, the load-balance monitor and
its meter flag, the solar monitor. Those land in extra, and the list maintains
itself — the four accessors note every key they read, extra is what is left, and
a field modelled later stops appearing there without anyone remembering to
remove it.

Keeping unnamed fields had one consequence worth guarding. An unmapped message
now decodes to something rather than nothing, and ingest stamped settingsAt for
anything that was not telemetry — the timestamp a control command waits on to
say the charger acknowledged it. A frame we cannot read is not an
acknowledgement, so the stamp is now conditional on the message type being one
we map, while its fields are kept either way.

Both cards show the remainder as what it is: the service's own key, no unit, no
translation, no renaming, under a heading that says whose words these are. The
blocks appear only when there is something in them, so a Modbus charger's
readings card and a charger the cloud says nothing more about are unchanged.
Naming one of these fields is a later commit, made from evidence; inventing a
label for it today would only make a guess look settled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:58:15 +02:00
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 90558d60b2 What the app can set, the cloud connection can set
The broker transport could move a session along — start, stop, boost, skip the
delay, cap the current — and nothing else. Everything the charger is actually
configured with sat one field away in the same messages we were already
decoding: the schedule it charges on, the plug lock, auto-start, the LED, load
balancing, solar charging, and the Modbus server the local transport depends on.
Readable, and unreachable.

The obstacle was never the cloud, it was the shape of the protocol. A setting is
not a register write. It is a *command*, and a command owns a set of fields
inside a message type — mostly one, but five own several, and the charger reads
the whole command as the new truth. A light-off schedule sent carrying only its
switch is a schedule whose start and end have just been set to midnight. So a
grouped write resends the siblings the caller did not name, using the values the
charger itself last reported, and refuses when it has never reported them. That
last part is not caution for its own sake: load balancing and solar charging
carry the serial of the meter they watch, and nothing outside the charger knows
it. An empty one would be adopted.

Those values do not arrive with the telemetry, either. The fast 0410 stream a
realtime trigger turns on carries none of them — the settings come on 0405, 0840
and 0900, which the charger sends when it has something to acknowledge. So a
grouped write may have to send a trigger first purely to make the charger talk
about itself, and says so plainly when even that produces nothing.

Everything a caller supplies is encoded before the cloud is touched at all. A
request naming one bad value changes nothing rather than half of what it asked
for, and a mistyped setting costs a validation error instead of a sign-in, a
certificate fetch and a broker connection to be told no.

mqttsettings.go holds one table and it is the only place a setting is defined:
the wire field, the name a caller uses, the state key its current value comes
from, and how a value becomes bytes. The names are the snapshot's own, so a
caller can read a status, change one entry and send it back. The existing limit
command now builds its frame from that table too rather than encoding field a8 a
second time.

Reading grew to match. The frame decoder gains the fields the grouped writes must
carry back — the two load-balance settings, both monitor serials, the solar
monitoring mode — plus the swipe gestures, and the snapshot exposes the rest of
what is now writable. One name was wrong and is corrected: field d9 was called
chargingMode after the Modbus register at 20088, but the reference has it as the
solar charging mode, so it becomes solarChargeMode and moves in beside the solar
settings. A mislabelled reading is bad; a mislabelled writable field is worse.

Over HTTP it is one action rather than a dozen, because the charger groups the
fields anyway: POST .../settings with a settings object, and settings sharing a
command travel in one frame instead of overwriting each other. The other two
transports refuse it by name and say which one has it, the way they already
refuse each other's commands. The audit trail records the values, not just that
a write happened — a setting that changes what the charger will draw, or whether
it answers on the LAN at all, is worth being able to trace afterwards.

Two things worth saying plainly. This is built from the reference project's
message maps and checked against its own frame layout, not against hardware —
there is no charger on this end to point it at. And modbusEnabled is a loaded
gun: writing it off stops the charger serving the register map, and the way back
is this transport, or the app.

The ignore rule for the local Modbus map artifact widens to the protocol maps
that now sit beside it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 18:28:45 +02:00
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 576df58776 Go the way the owner's phone already goes
Control had two transports and neither fitted the ordinary customer. OCPP waits
for the charger to dial in, which needs a public endpoint it can reach, a
certificate, and a firmware willing to talk to our CSMS. Modbus TCP dials the
charger, which needs the server on the charger's own network. Between them they
cover a charger we host and a charger we stand next to; the common case is a
charger behind someone else's router, and that had nothing.

It was never unreachable, though. The charger holds a connection open to Anker's
own broker — it is how the mobile app drives it from anywhere, and it is the
mqttStatus register the Modbus snapshot has been reporting all along. So a third
control mode joins that broker as the account: get_user_mqtt_info issues a client
certificate, mTLS to aiot-mqtt-eu.anker.com:8883, and commands go out on the same
topics the app publishes on. Nothing on the customer's side has to be forwarded,
addressed or certificated.

What travels is not an API call. The payload is a JSON envelope around a base64
binary frame the device itself speaks — marker, little-endian length, message
type, name/length/type/value fields, XOR checksum — so mqttframe.go is a codec
rather than a client, written from the message maps in anker-solix-api and
anchored on the one frame that project documents byte for byte. A frame whose
fields do not tile exactly up to the checksum is refused rather than half-read:
these arrive over a link we do not control, and a truncated frame must not read
as a charger reporting zeros.

Two of the charger's habits shape the rest. It publishes nothing unless asked, so
a status read arms a telemetry trigger and waits for the next frame, and a poll
inside that window answers from what has since arrived. And a broker connection
costs a fetched certificate and a TLS handshake while the plugin manager builds a
throwaway instance per request — so the connection lives on the account's shared
session beside the auth token, for exactly the reason the token lives there, and
closes itself after five idle minutes.

The transport also sees two signals no other one does: the boost flag, and the
plug and start countdowns. The package doc has said since the first commit that
they are never set and the derived mode must do without them. Here they are set,
so a charger that has been told to start and is counting down a delay says so
rather than sitting in "preparing", and "skip the delay" is offered only while
there is a delay to skip.

The clients generalise instead of growing a second layout. Both snapshots name
the same quantities the same way, so what was Modbus-only in the readouts is now
whichever transport read the charger — ModbusStatus becomes ChargerStatus on the
phone, mb becomes dev on the web. What each transport can be *told* still
differs, and the buttons branch on that: reset and clear-limit stay with OCPP,
the timeout and phase registers with Modbus, skip-delay with the cloud. A command
a transport has no equivalent for is refused by name, saying which one has it.

The cost is worth saying plainly. This leans on Anker's cloud being up and on an
unofficial protocol the app may change under us, where Modbus leans on nothing
but the LAN. And it is checked against the reference implementation's own worked
example rather than against hardware — there is no charger on this end to point
it at.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:47:10 +02:00