Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 ee4ac441be Plugins: drop the plugins.json migration, and the volume it needed
The project has no public installs, so there is nothing to migrate from.
MigrateLegacyFile, the file-backed Store it read through, PLUGINS_FILE and
the legacy path threaded through the Server all go. What is left is one
store, PocketBase, and a plugins package that touches no filesystem at all.

That was the last thing keeping api_data alive, so the volume goes too. All
four compose files now declare exactly one volume, pb_data, and the
standalone API Server compose declares none - it talks to an external
PocketBase and has nothing of its own to keep. Backing up the stack is
backing up one path again.

Both images get simpler for it. The API Server image loses VOLUME /data and
the su-exec entrypoint that existed only to fix a mounted volume's
ownership, so it goes back to a plain USER app; its working directory is
now /app and holds nothing. The AIO image loses its second volume and
chowns only /pb/pb_data.

One consequence worth stating plainly, because it is a small regression
rather than a no-op. The panel's Settings -> PocketBase and Settings -> Web
App screens write .env in the working directory, which is now ephemeral. In
the multi-container stack that changes nothing: compose sets all five of
those keys as container environment, and loadDotEnv only applies a key that
is not already set, so the file could never win a restart there anyway. In
the AIO image it did win for POCKETBASE_ADMIN_EMAIL/_PASSWORD, which are
not in that container's environment - so a service account fixed from the
panel now lasts only until the container is recreated. Both READMEs say so.
Moving those two screens into the app_settings singleton would close it
properly; the PocketBase URL and credentials cannot follow, since they are
how the database is reached in the first place.

go build, go vet and go test ./... pass; the compose files parse and each
resolves to a single pb_data volume. Not verified: no Docker CLI here, so
neither image was built.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 17:41:02 +02:00
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 9bd5c523c4 Plugins: the global layer moves into the database, beside the other two
The integration cascade stored its top layer differently from the two below
it: org (L2) and user (L3) plugin config lived in PocketBase, in a
pluginSettings field, while the global (L1) layer sat in a plugins.json
next to the binary. That split was accretion rather than design - the file
was the whole store in the v1 MVP, and the per-tenant layers were later
built on PocketBase and layered on top of it instead of replacing it.

It also cost something real. plugins.json was a second state store with
different durability from pb_data: its own volume, its own ownership, its
own backup. Losing pb_data is unmissable; losing api_data was silent, which
is how "every plugin comes back disabled after a redeploy" happened.

L1 now lives in the app_settings collection - one record keyed "global",
holding its settings in a pluginSettings field, the same mechanism and the
same field name the layers below use. The documents still differ in shape,
because only L1 carries enable state and the registration of external
plugins, but the storage is no longer a special case.

The Manager grows a Store seam (PocketBase in production, file for the
import, memory for tests) and, more importantly, a loaded gate. Settings in
a database mean the store can be unreachable at boot - a cold stack, or a
service account still to be set from the panel. That must not read as "no
plugins configured", or the first save would write emptiness over real
settings. So until a read succeeds the Manager stays unloaded, every
mutation is refused, /api/admin/plugins* answers 503, and a background
retry backs off to two minutes. The same gate covers a document that will
not parse: it is never replaced by one built from an empty map, which is a
stronger guarantee than the .corrupt backup it replaces.

Writing to a store also revealed a hole in the previous fix. Classifying a
save failure as errPersist was left to each Store, and a store that
returned a plain error would fall through to the "saved, but the plugin
failed to start" branch and be reported as a 200 - the same silent-success
bug through a different door. The Manager now classifies, whatever the
Store returns; a test pins it.

Upgrades are automatic: on the first boot that finds no settings in the
database, an existing plugins.json is imported and renamed to
plugins.json.migrated. The import is refused if the store is merely
unreachable, or if the file does not parse, so a stale or broken file can
never overwrite live settings. /data is still needed - the panel rewrites
.env there when it retargets PocketBase - but plugin settings no longer
depend on it.

21 tests in internal/plugins cover both stores, including the production
path against a fake PocketBase: create-then-update of the singleton,
round-trip across a restart, an outage that leaves settings intact, a
missing collection reading as not-ready rather than empty, and the import
running exactly once. go build, go vet and go test ./... pass. Schema
changes are mirrored into scripts/setup-pocketbase.mjs as that file
requires. Not verified: no Docker CLI here, so no image was built and the
bootstrap of app_settings against a real PocketBase is untested outside the
fake.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 16:52:47 +02:00
tajniak81andClaude Opus 4.8 19a7d48feb Harden Anker Solix OCPP control (token hashing, step-up, audit, TLS)
Security pass over the OCPP charger-control feature added in a1519f6, since
remotely actuating a physical charger is a real side effect.

Token hygiene:
  - Per-charger control tokens are stored as SHA-256 hashes + a last-4 hint,
    never plaintext. The token is shown once at generation; the status endpoint
    returns only the hint. Added a revoke endpoint that also drops any live
    session using the revoked token.

Step-up + confirmation:
  - Destructive actions (reset, unlock) require confirm:true AND a password
    re-authentication (verified against PocketBase). The Charging UI collects the
    password inline for reset.
  - Per user+charger rate limit (30/min) on control commands.

Transport + provenance:
  - OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS (default on) rejects plaintext ws:// charger connections;
    OCPP_PUBLIC_URL pins the advertised endpoint instead of trusting request
    headers.
  - Proxy-mode upstream URL is validated against a *.anker.com allowlist, so a
    spoofed ocpp-info response can't redirect the proxy.

Durable audit:
  - New control_audit PocketBase collection (added to setup-pocketbase.mjs);
    every control action, token generate/revoke and charger connect is persisted
    best-effort in addition to a structured log line.

Startup:
  - The control-token index is warmed from PocketBase on startup so a charger
    reconnecting after a restart resolves immediately.

Tests:
  - Unit tests for token hashing/eviction/revoke (no plaintext at rest),
    rate limiter, destructive-action classifier, upstream allowlist, TLS
    enforcement, and re-auth guards. A full-stack E2E (control_e2e_test.go)
    drives the real Handler with a stand-in PocketBase and a simulated charge
    point, proving step-up (400/401/200) and audit persistence end to end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 21:03:05 +02:00