driver-vault/DriverVault
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Files
3c34b708b9e407561c18a379058b40008f23ecce
DriverVault/Docker/README.md
T
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 fe1e314df9 The store comes apart into the four roles it always had 
`weed server -s3` was never one thing. Master, volume, filer and the S3
gateway ran as four goroutines under one process, on one volume, sharing one
fate. Splitting them into four containers changes nothing a client can see —
the same bucket answers on the same port — but it makes three things possible
that were not: the SeaweedFS admin UI, which wants a cluster to look at; a
restart or an upgrade of one role without the others; and, eventually, a second
volume server somewhere else. A fifth container carries the panel itself.

The single-process files stay exactly as they were. These are `.split.` twins
beside them, four in all, one per folder per shape, each with the .env example
of the same name that both READMEs already promise.

Identities are the part that could not simply be copied across. SeaweedFS picks
its credentials from one source, in order: an -s3.config file, the filer's IAM
store, then AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and its secret — and a higher source replaces a
lower one rather than adding to it. The existing files use the env pair, which
is fine precisely because nothing else writes identities there. Hand somebody a
panel that can, and the first user they create lands in the filer's store, the
store outranks the environment, and PocketBase's key stops existing — with the
first failed upload as the notification. So the gateway here is started with no
config file and no AWS_* at all, and the init container seeds PocketBase's
identity into the filer's store instead: the same store the panel writes. One
source of truth, PocketBase's key sitting in Object Store → Users beside every
other, keys minted there picked up without a restart, and a rotated
PB_S3_SECRET re-applied in place on the next boot rather than added as a second
identity.

That seeding is now allowed to fail. The bucket-create it grew out of was
best-effort — `|| true`, on the reasoning that the API Server's own S3 check
would report a gateway that was genuinely unreachable. That reasoning does not
survive the change: a gateway whose IAM store is empty does not refuse anyone,
it serves everyone, and the bucket would be wide open rather than unreachable.
So the step ends by grepping the configuration back for the access key, the
gateway waits on it completing successfully, and a seed that did not land stops
the stack instead of opening it.

The prod files publish the gateway and the panel, both on loopback, and nothing
else. Port 8080 on the volume server hands out file content by file id with no
authentication of any kind — the S3 credentials have no bearing on it — so
publishing it would publish every attachment in the stack, and the panel shows
what that port and the master's would. The panel's own password is required
rather than defaulted, because weed serves it with authentication switched off
entirely when it is empty, and a page that mints bucket credentials is the
bucket. It is passed as WEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD rather than a flag so it stays off
the process command line, and SEAWEED_ADMIN_BIND is the knob a remote host
needs, named after PB_BIND and API_BIND for the same reason.

Master, volume and filer share one /data mount rather than taking three of
their own. That is precisely the layout `weed server -dir=/data` writes — the
master's raft state, the volume's .dat and .idx, the filer's filerldb2, no two
of them naming the same file — so a stack can move between the single-process
file and its twin in either direction with nothing to migrate. A second volume
server would need its own, and the files say so where somebody would go looking.

The dev files map the volume server to 8081 on the host: 8080 there is already
the API Server, and in the all-in-one it is the API Server inside the image.

Unexercised: written on a machine without Docker, so none of the four has been
brought up. Every flag, health path and env name was read out of the pinned
4.45 source rather than recalled — -mdir, -volumeSizeLimitMB, -defaultStoreDir,
-max, admin's -master and -dataDir and WEED_ADMIN_*, the filer's and gateway's
/healthz, the panel's unauthenticated /health — and the four files were parsed,
interpolated against their examples, and checked for duplicate host ports. A
`docker compose config` on the target host is still the first thing to run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 20:35:42 +02:00

221 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

# DriverVault — Docker (multi-container stack)
Three containers — **PocketBase**, **API Server**, **Web App** — on one compose
network. This is the deployment to use unless you specifically want everything
in a single image; for that see [`../Docker-AIO`](../Docker-AIO).
```
Browser ─► Web App BFF (:8090) ──/api/*──► API Server (:8080) ─► PocketBase (:8070)
```
Only the Web App port is meant to be public. The API Server and the PocketBase
admin UI are published for convenience and, in the prod file, bound to
`127.0.0.1` by default.
| File | Use |
|---|---|
| `docker-compose.yml` | **builds from source** in this repo — for development and local testing |
| `docker-compose.prod.yml` | **pulls prebuilt images** from the registry — for deployment |
| `.env.example` / `.env.prod.example` | copy to `.env` for the matching compose file |
| `pocketbase/` | the PocketBase image (official release binary on alpine) |
## Run it
```bash
cd Docker
cp .env.example .env # then edit — PB_ADMIN_* have no safe defaults
docker compose up -d --build
```
Production, from the registry:
```bash
cp .env.prod.example .env # then edit
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
```
Then: web app on `http://host:8090/`, the API Server's superadmin panel on
`http://host:8080/`, PocketBase admin on `http://host:8070/_/`.
## First boot
Both steps are idempotent, so restarts and upgrades are safe:
1. **PocketBase** upserts its superuser from `PB_ADMIN_EMAIL` / `PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD`.
This is the only way to create the first superuser — the REST API cannot
bootstrap it. The API Server then authenticates with the same credentials.
2. **The API Server** creates any missing collections and reconciles existing
ones, then creates the first app `superadmin` from
`DRIVERVAULT_SUPERADMIN_EMAIL` / `_PASSWORD` if no such user exists.
> Leave `PB_BOOTSTRAP` at `true`, including across upgrades. A release can add
> collections or fields the server needs, and a stack that skipped the bootstrap
> never gets them. The API Server self-heals exactly one thing — `app_settings`,
> the collection holding the plugin settings, which it creates on demand because
> it cannot serve the plugin panel without it. Every other schema change still
> depends on this flag, so turn it off only for a database you know already
> matches the release you are running.
No manual `setup-pocketbase.mjs` step is needed here — the server runs the same
schema reconcile itself.
## Volumes
| Volume | Holds |
|---|---|
| `pb_data` | the PocketBase SQLite database and uploaded files — everything that persists |
One volume, because the API Server keeps no state on disk. Plugin enable-state
and global config live in the database like the rest of the settings, so backing
up `pb_data` backs up the whole stack. It defaults to a Docker-managed named
volume; set `PB_DATA` to an absolute host path in the prod file for a bind mount
instead. PocketBase runs as root, so a root-owned host directory is fine.
> One thing does **not** persist: the API Server panel's *Settings → PocketBase*
> and *Settings → Web App* screens apply immediately but only for the life of the
> container. Set `POCKETBASE_URL`, `PB_ADMIN_EMAIL` / `PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD`,
> `WEBAPP_URL` and `CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS` in `.env` to change them permanently —
> in this stack the compose environment wins over anything the panel writes.
## File storage (SeaweedFS / S3)
Uploaded files — document scans, service and refill receipts, workshop invoices,
part photos — live inside `pb_data` by default, next to the database. Two further
compose files put them in an S3 bucket instead, so the blobs and the database can
be sized, backed up and moved independently. Nothing else changes: an attachment has
always been fetched through the API Server (`GET /api/service-records/{id}/file`),
never from a storage URL, so the Web App, the phone app and the Home Assistant
plugin cannot tell the difference.
Each shape is one self-contained compose file — nothing to layer, nothing to
remember — with an `.env` example of the same name:
| Shape | From the registry | From source |
|---|---|---|
| **Local storage** — the default, unchanged | `docker-compose.prod.yml` | `docker-compose.yml` |
| **SeaweedFS in this stack** | `docker-compose.prod.seaweedfs.yml` | `docker-compose.seaweedfs.yml` |
| **SeaweedFS, split into its roles** | `docker-compose.prod.seaweedfs.split.yml` | `docker-compose.seaweedfs.split.yml` |
| **An S3 endpoint outside it** | `docker-compose.prod.s3.yml` | `docker-compose.s3.yml` |
So `docker-compose.prod.seaweedfs.yml` is configured from
`.env.prod.seaweedfs.example`, `docker-compose.s3.yml` from `.env.s3.example`,
and so on:
```sh
cp .env.prod.seaweedfs.example .env # then edit it — PB_S3_* have no defaults
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.seaweedfs.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.seaweedfs.yml up -d
```
Set `PB_S3_ACCESS_KEY` and `PB_S3_SECRET` first — both storage files refuse to
start without them. The SeaweedFS ones add a `seaweedfs` container (master,
volume, filer and S3 gateway in one process, on its own `seaweed_data` volume)
plus a one-shot `seaweedfs-init` that creates the bucket, because PocketBase never
issues a `CreateBucket` of its own. The external-S3 ones add no containers at
all: set `PB_S3_ENDPOINT`, and create the bucket yourself.
### Split SeaweedFS
`weed server -s3` runs master, volume, filer and gateway as four goroutines in
one process. The `.split.` files run them as four containers, plus a fifth: the
SeaweedFS **admin UI** on port 23646, where the cluster can be inspected and —
under *Object Store → Users* — further S3 identities minted and revoked. Split
also gets you per-role restarts and upgrades, per-role Prometheus metrics, and
room to add a second volume server later.
Identities work differently there, and it matters. SeaweedFS reads credentials
from, in descending priority: an `-s3.config` file, the filer's IAM store, then
`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` / `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` — and a higher source *replaces*
a lower one rather than adding to it. The single-process files use the env vars,
which is why nothing else may write identities there: the first user added in a
panel would displace PocketBase's key. So in the split files `seaweedfs-init`
seeds PocketBase's identity into the filer's store instead — the same store the
admin UI writes — and the gateway runs with no config file at all. One source of
truth, PocketBase's key visible in the panel beside every other, and new keys
picked up without a restart. Rotating `PB_S3_SECRET` in `.env` and restarting
updates that identity in place.
Set `SEAWEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD`: `weed admin` serves the panel with no
authentication when it is empty, and a panel that can mint bucket credentials is
the bucket. In the prod file it is bound to loopback like `PB_BIND` and
`API_BIND`, so a remote host needs `SEAWEED_ADMIN_BIND=0.0.0.0` behind the same
reverse proxy. That file publishes nothing for master, volume and filer — the
volume server serves file content by id with no authentication of any kind, and
the admin UI already shows what those ports would.
Switching between `docker-compose.seaweedfs.yml` and its `.split.` twin needs no
migration: master, volume and filer share one `/data` mount, which is exactly
the layout `weed server -dir=/data` writes.
On every boot the API Server's bootstrap writes PocketBase's *Files storage*
settings from those variables, then asks PocketBase to prove it can reach the
bucket. Watch for it in the log:
```
[api] bootstrap: ✓ file storage → S3 (drivervault at http://seaweedfs:8333)
[api] bootstrap: ✓ S3 storage reachable
```
A boot that finds the settings already correct logs `• file storage already on S3`
and writes nothing.
Two things to know before turning it on:
- **Existing files are not migrated.** PocketBase copies nothing when the setting
flips, so attachments uploaded before the switch stop resolving. Copy
`pb_data/storage/<collectionId>/<recordId>/<file>` into the bucket root, keeping
that layout, *before* enabling it — or start from a stack with no attachments.
- **Going back to the plain compose file is not an off switch.** It leaves
PocketBase pointed at
the bucket, deliberately: files already written there are reachable only while
it is. Move them back and turn it off in PocketBase's own admin UI. For the same
reason a rotation of `PB_S3_SECRET` alone is invisible to the bootstrap —
PocketBase masks the stored secret on read — so change another `PB_S3_*` value
alongside it, or set it in the admin UI.
## Charger control (OCPP)
Chargers in own/proxy mode dial in to `/ocpp/{serial}`, authenticating with a
per-charger control token in an OCPP Basic-auth header. Two ports answer that
path: the API Server's own, and the Web App's, whose BFF proxies `/ocpp/`
through. The second one matters because it is the address the panel hands out —
the endpoint is derived from the host the panel itself was reached on, which is
the Web App, unless `OCPP_PUBLIC_URL` says otherwise.
A plaintext `ws://` puts the control token on the wire in the clear, so
`OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS` defaults to `true` and non-TLS connections are rejected.
`OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=false` is for a trusted network you own end to end.
### With a public hostname and TLS
Nothing in this stack terminates TLS. Put your own reverse proxy in front of the
Web App port, give it a certificate and a hostname, and set four things by hand:
```sh
# in .env
OCPP_PUBLIC_URL=wss://drivervault.example.com
OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=true
CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS=https://drivervault.example.com
TRUST_FORWARDED_PROTO=true
```
`TRUST_FORWARDED_PROTO` is the easy one to miss: without it the Web App's BFF
overwrites the proxy's `X-Forwarded-Proto` with its own plaintext hop and every
charger is rejected as insecure. Only set it when that proxy really is the only
way in — otherwise a charger could claim `wss` over a plaintext connection.
Point the charger's OCPP backend at the endpoint the panel then shows, with the
control token as its authorization key. The charger has to resolve that hostname
too: behind NAT that usually means hairpin NAT, or a split-DNS entry pointing the
name at the LAN address.
## Notes
- `docker-compose.yml` builds the API Server and Web App from `../API Server`
and `../Web App`, so run it from this directory with the repo checked out.
- The Web App's Vue bundle is built with an empty `VITE_API_BASE`, so the
browser uses same-origin `/api` and the BFF proxies it — no CORS in play.
- `CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS` therefore only matters if a browser calls the API Server
directly. Native mobile apps are not subject to CORS at all.
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink