tajniak81andClaude Opus 5.5
6aaf554336
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Implements PLAN.md Phase 5: the Server-Server API. Warp joins rooms on other servers and lets their users join its rooms, invites across servers with the invitee's server countersigning, rejects remote invites (locally if the inviter is unreachable), and exchanges events, typing, receipts and to-device messages with other homeservers — all behind the runtime switch, which now starts and stops real outbound traffic. The protocol lives in internal/federation with no knowledge of rooms: X-Matrix signing (fuzzed parser), the spec's discovery algorithm keeping the dial address and the TLS name apart, a signed client that refuses every request while the switch is off or the policy denies the destination, and a key ring that caches other servers' keys for at most a week, with optional notaries. The roomserver takes events from elsewhere through the spec's intake: signatures and hashes (a hash mismatch keeps the redacted form), the rules against the event's own auth events, against the state before it — with /get_missing_events for small gaps and /state_ids for wide ones — and against the current state, where a failure is a soft failure. Events held without their state are outliers: a column on roomserver_events, because the current state of a room joined over federation is almost all outliers, and excluded from every timeline query. Forks are resolved at the room's head. Membership across servers is make_join/send_join, make_leave/send_leave and countersigned invites, in both directions; m.room.server_acl is enforced on everything another server sends. History before a remote join is backfilled when /messages pages past it, stored at negative stream positions. internal/federationapi is the running component: the inbound endpoints, and an outbound queue that persists what it owes each destination, sends it in transactions of 50 PDUs and 100 EDUs, backs off from ten seconds to six hours, survives restarts, and drops events persisted while federation is off rather than delivering a backlog in one burst. Its Module is what the switch starts and stops. Also: a TLS listener for port 8448, trusted key servers, key validity and an outbound CA bundle in the config; per-destination health and backoff reset in the admin API; remote profiles, aliases and directories in the Client-Server API; a Complement federation profile. See docs/federation.md, including its known gaps (no partial-state joins, no key rotation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package roomserver
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/auth"
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"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/event"
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"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/signing"
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)
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// eventVerifier checks an event's signature from a named server.
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//
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// This server's own signatures are checked against the key in hand, which
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// is what keeps every rule that needs a signature — a restricted join
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// authorised by a local user, chiefly — working with federation off.
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// Anybody else's go to the key ring, and only while federation is on: with
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// it off there is no way to fetch a key, and a signature that cannot be
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// checked is refused rather than waved through, the same answer the switch
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// gives everywhere else.
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type eventVerifier struct {
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serverName string
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key *signing.KeyPair
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remote auth.Verifier
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enabled func() bool
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}
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// verifier returns the Verifier the authorisation rules are given.
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func (r *API) verifier() *eventVerifier {
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return &eventVerifier{
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serverName: r.serverName,
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key: r.signingKey,
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remote: r.keys,
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enabled: r.federationEnabled,
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}
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}
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// VerifyEventSignature implements auth.Verifier.
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func (v *eventVerifier) VerifyEventSignature(ctx context.Context, serverName string, e *event.Event) error {
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if serverName == v.serverName {
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return e.VerifySignature(v.serverName, v.key.KeyID(), v.key.Public)
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}
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if v.remote == nil || !v.enabled() {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot verify a signature from %s", ErrFederationDisabled, serverName)
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}
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return v.remote.VerifyEventSignature(ctx, serverName, e)
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}
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// verifyIncoming checks an event from another server before anything else
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// looks at it: it must be signed by its sender's server, and its content
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// must match its hash.
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//
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// A content hash mismatch is not a rejection. The signature covers only
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// what a redaction keeps, so an event whose signature verifies and whose
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// hash does not is an event somebody has redacted — legitimately, or by
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// tampering with the parts the signature does not cover — and the spec's
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// answer to both is the same: keep the redacted form.
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func (r *API) verifyIncoming(ctx context.Context, e *event.Event) (*event.Event, error) {
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sender, err := e.SenderServer()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s: %v", ErrBadEvent, e.EventID(), err)
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}
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if err := r.verifier().VerifyEventSignature(ctx, sender, e); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not signed by %s: %v", ErrBadEvent, e.EventID(), sender, err)
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}
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if err := e.VerifyContentHash(); err != nil {
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redacted, rerr := e.Redact()
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if rerr != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s: %v", ErrBadEvent, e.EventID(), rerr)
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}
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r.log.Info("event failed its content hash; using its redacted form",
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"event_id", e.EventID(), "sender", e.Sender())
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return redacted, nil
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}
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return e, nil
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}
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