Implements PLAN.md Phase 6: the media repository. Clients upload files, reserve an mxc:// URI and upload to it later, download and ask for thumbnails, all through the authenticated media endpoints of Matrix 1.11; other servers download this server's media through the federation media endpoints, and media uploaded elsewhere is fetched over federation on first use and kept. internal/mediaapi is the component. Content goes into a BlobStore named by its SHA-256, so the same file uploaded twice is stored once and the hash doubles as the ETag; the metadata that maps an mxc:// URI onto a blob is in media_repository and media_thumbnails. The local-filesystem store writes to a temporary file and renames it into place once hashed, so nothing ever refers to half a file. A storage driver can bring its own store through storage.BlobProvider, which is where PocketBase's filesystem abstraction (local or S3) plugs in with Phase 10. Reserved uploads belong to the user who made them, take one upload, lapse after a day, and are capped per user; a download of one waits for its content, woken in memory the moment it arrives, for as long as timeout_ms allows. Thumbnails come from a fixed set of configured sizes, so a thousand requested sizes cannot mean a thousand resizes. They are made on first request and kept, never enlarge, honour a JPEG's EXIF orientation, and point at the original when it already fits. The pixel count is checked from the header before anything is decoded, at most four resizes run at once, and concurrent requests for the same thumbnail share one. Remote media is fetched through the signed client: the multipart/mixed answer of Matrix 1.11, with a fallback to the legacy download endpoint for servers that answer M_UNRECOGNIZED, and Location redirects followed by a dialer that refuses loopback, private and link-local addresses. Concurrent requests share one fetch, detached from the request that started it. With federation off nothing is fetched, and what was cached before is still served. Downloads carry a sandboxing CSP, nosniff, inline Content-Disposition only for the types the spec lists as safe, and private immutable caching. The unauthenticated legacy download endpoints are off by default behind media.legacy_unauthenticated_downloads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Configuration
Warp reads one YAML file. Every setting can also come from the
environment, and the environment wins. With no file at all the defaults
plus WARP_* variables are used, which is how the container image runs.
Where the file comes from, in order:
--config <path>$WARP_CONFIG./warp.yaml, if it exists- nothing — defaults and environment only
An unknown field is a fatal error. A typo in a security-relevant setting must not be ignored.
List-valued variables are comma-separated. A single - clears a list:
WARP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=-.
Settings
| YAML | Environment | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
global.server_name |
WARP_SERVER_NAME |
— | Required. Part of every ID; cannot be changed later. |
global.private_key |
WARP_PRIVATE_KEY |
./keys/signing.key |
Written by warp generate-keys. |
global.well_known.client_base_url |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_CLIENT_BASE_URL |
https://<server_name> |
Advertised to clients. |
global.well_known.identity_server_base_url |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_IDENTITY_SERVER_BASE_URL |
empty | Omitted from the document when empty. |
global.well_known.server_address |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_SERVER_ADDRESS |
empty | host:port for other homeservers. Empty = no delegation, other servers fall back to SRV/A. |
listen.address |
WARP_LISTEN_ADDRESS |
:8008 |
|
listen.read_header_timeout |
WARP_READ_HEADER_TIMEOUT |
10s |
|
listen.read_timeout |
WARP_READ_TIMEOUT |
60s |
|
listen.write_timeout |
WARP_WRITE_TIMEOUT |
120s |
Must stay above sync.long_poll_timeout, or a blocked /sync is cut off before it can answer. |
listen.idle_timeout |
WARP_IDLE_TIMEOUT |
120s |
|
listen.max_header_bytes |
WARP_MAX_HEADER_BYTES |
1048576 |
|
listen.shutdown_timeout |
WARP_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT |
30s |
Grace period for in-flight requests. |
listen.federation_address |
WARP_LISTEN_FEDERATION_ADDRESS |
empty | A second listener serving the same API over TLS, usually :8448. Empty = none; see Federation over TLS. |
listen.tls_cert_file |
WARP_TLS_CERT_FILE |
empty | PEM certificate chain for the federation listener. Required with it. |
listen.tls_key_file |
WARP_TLS_KEY_FILE |
empty | PEM key for the federation listener. Required with it. |
database.driver |
WARP_DB_DRIVER |
sqlite |
sqlite, postgres, pocketbase (not implemented). |
database.connection_string |
WARP_DB_CONNECTION_STRING |
SQLite file in the working directory | |
database.max_open_conns |
WARP_DB_MAX_OPEN_CONNS |
10 |
Ignored by SQLite: writes are serialised onto one connection. |
database.max_idle_conns |
WARP_DB_MAX_IDLE_CONNS |
5 |
|
database.conn_max_lifetime |
WARP_DB_CONN_MAX_LIFETIME |
1h |
|
database.auto_migrate |
WARP_DB_AUTO_MIGRATE |
true |
false makes startup fail while migrations are pending. |
client_api.cors_allowed_origins |
WARP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
["*"] |
The spec expects any origin. |
client_api.trust_x_forwarded_for |
WARP_TRUST_X_FORWARDED_FOR |
false |
Only behind a proxy that overwrites the header; the rate limiter keys on the result. |
client_api.access_token_lifetime |
WARP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME |
0s |
0 = never expire. With a lifetime, clients may ask for a refresh token at login. |
client_api.refresh_token_lifetime |
WARP_REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME |
0s |
0 = never expire. |
client_api.rate_limit.enabled |
WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED |
true |
|
client_api.rate_limit.default.burst / .interval |
— | 30 / 100ms |
Every rate-limited endpoint without its own bucket. |
client_api.rate_limit.login.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
/login and /refresh. |
client_api.rate_limit.register.burst / .interval |
— | 5 / 2s |
/register and /register/available. |
client_api.rate_limit.room_create.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
/createRoom, which writes a dozen events per call. |
client_api.rate_limit.join.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
The two join endpoints. |
client_api.rate_limit.sync.burst / .interval |
— | 100 / 20ms |
/sync and the writes behind it: typing, receipts, to-device, presence. |
client_api.rate_limit.media.burst / .interval |
— | 100 / 20ms |
Media downloads and thumbnails: a client opening a room asks for every avatar at once. Uploads are in the default bucket. |
sync.presence |
WARP_SYNC_PRESENCE |
false |
Off by default; see below. |
sync.typing_timeout |
WARP_SYNC_TYPING_TIMEOUT |
30s |
How long a typing notification lasts, and the cap on what a client may ask for. |
sync.long_poll_timeout |
WARP_SYNC_LONG_POLL_TIMEOUT |
30s |
The cap on a /sync ?timeout=. |
federation.enabled |
WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED |
false |
|
federation.allowlist |
WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOWLIST |
[] |
Non-empty = federate only with these. |
federation.denylist |
WARP_FEDERATION_DENYLIST |
[] |
Always wins over the allowlist. |
federation.allow_runtime_toggle |
WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE |
true |
See below. |
federation.trusted_key_servers |
WARP_FEDERATION_TRUSTED_KEY_SERVERS |
[] |
Notaries asked for a server's key when it cannot be reached itself, e.g. matrix.org. Empty = only ever ask the server. |
federation.key_validity_period |
WARP_FEDERATION_KEY_VALIDITY_PERIOD |
24h |
How long other servers may cache this server's key. At most 168h. |
federation.tls_ca_file |
WARP_FEDERATION_TLS_CA_FILE |
empty | Extra CA certificates (PEM) for outbound federation, on top of the system roots. |
media.base_path |
WARP_MEDIA_BASE_PATH |
./media_store |
Where media content is kept. Created on the first upload. |
media.max_upload_bytes |
WARP_MEDIA_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES |
52428800 |
The largest upload (50 MiB), and the largest file fetched from another server. Reported to clients as m.upload.size. |
media.max_thumbnail_pixels |
WARP_MEDIA_MAX_THUMBNAIL_PIXELS |
32000000 |
The largest image, in pixels, decoded to make a thumbnail. |
media.thumbnail_sizes |
— | five sizes, see media.md | The thumbnails this server makes, as {width, height, method}. Empty = no thumbnails. |
media.pending_upload_expiry |
WARP_MEDIA_PENDING_UPLOAD_EXPIRY |
24h |
How long an ID reserved with POST /media/v1/create waits for its content. |
media.max_pending_uploads |
WARP_MEDIA_MAX_PENDING_UPLOADS |
10 |
How many of those one user may hold. |
media.legacy_unauthenticated_downloads |
WARP_MEDIA_LEGACY_UNAUTHENTICATED_DOWNLOADS |
false |
Also serve the deprecated /_matrix/media/v3/download and /thumbnail, which need no token. Only for clients older than Matrix 1.11. |
registration.enabled |
WARP_REGISTRATION_ENABLED |
false |
|
registration.allow_runtime_toggle |
WARP_REGISTRATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE |
true |
|
registration.tokens |
WARP_REGISTRATION_TOKENS |
[] |
Non-empty = sign-up also needs one of these, as the m.login.registration_token stage. |
logging.level |
WARP_LOG_LEVEL |
info |
debug, info, warn, error. |
logging.format |
WARP_LOG_FORMAT |
text |
text or json. |
logging.add_source |
WARP_LOG_ADD_SOURCE |
false |
File and line in every record. |
metrics.enabled |
WARP_METRICS_ENABLED |
true |
|
metrics.path |
WARP_METRICS_PATH |
/metrics |
Served on the same listener. |
The rate limit buckets share one Go type, so per-bucket environment
variables would all collide on the same name; they are YAML only.
WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=false turns the whole limiter off, which is what a
test harness wants.
Rate limiting
Each bucket allows burst requests back to back and returns one slot every
interval, keyed per client address. Over the limit is
429 M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED with a retry_after_ms the client is expected to
honour.
Buckets are per endpoint class, so a client hammering /login cannot spend
the budget of /profile. The key is the client address and not the user,
because the limiter runs before the access token is resolved — a limiter
that had to query the database to find its own key would be a denial of
service of its own. Behind a reverse proxy, set
client_api.trust_x_forwarded_for: true, or every client shares one bucket.
The admin API under /_warp/admin/v1 is not rate limited: it needs an admin
token, and bulk operations from the panel are exactly the traffic a limiter
would get in the way of.
Presence
sync.presence is off by default. Presence — who is online, and the status
message they set — is the noisiest thing in Matrix: every user's state
change is published to everybody they share a room with, which over
federation is quadratic in the worst case. Synapse deployments routinely
turn it off for that reason, and a private homeserver with a dozen users
gains little from it.
With it off:
GETandPUT /presence/{userId}/statusanswer403 M_FORBIDDEN. They are deliberately not unregistered: a client that gets a 404 from/presenceconcludes the server is too old to have it and stops asking, where a refusal says this one has it switched off.- The
presencesection of a/syncresponse is empty. ?set_presence=on/syncis ignored rather than refused — it rides on every sync a client sends, and failing them all would make the server unusable.
It is a boot-time setting, not a runtime one: turning it on starts publishing a stream that nothing was tracking before, and a server that could do that mid-flight would owe every connected client a resync.
Long polling
/sync holds a request open until something happens or the timeout
expires, so listen.write_timeout has to stay above
sync.long_poll_timeout — otherwise the listener cuts off a blocked sync
before it can answer, and the client sees a dropped connection instead of
an empty response.
Raising sync.long_poll_timeout does not make a client hear about messages
sooner: a blocked sync is woken the moment anything concerning it is
written. All the timeout decides is how often an idle client
re-establishes its request.
Settings that change at runtime
federation.enabled and registration.enabled are also stored in the
server_settings database table, which is what the admin API writes to.
- With
allow_runtime_toggle: true(the default) the stored value wins over the config file at boot, and the admin API may change it. The change takes effect on the next request; no restart. - With
allow_runtime_toggle: falsethe config file is authoritative and the admin API refuses to change the setting. Any previously stored value is kept but ignored, so re-enabling the toggle restores the administrator's last choice.
Everything else is read once at startup.
What federation off actually means
While federation.enabled is false:
/_matrix/federation/*,/_matrix/key/*and/.well-known/matrix/serveranswer404 M_UNRECOGNIZED, exactly as on a server with no federation API. The TLS listener onlisten.federation_address, if there is one, stays up and answers the same way.- Nothing outbound runs. The transaction queue is stopped, and the federation client refuses every request — key fetches, joins, profile and alias lookups — before it opens a connection, so a component that somehow missed the switch still cannot reach another server.
- Events persisted while it is off are not queued for other servers. A remote server that cares about the room fetches what it missed the next time it hears from this one. What was already queued when the switch went off stays queued, and goes out when it comes back on.
- Client-Server endpoints that would need a remote server answer
M_FORBIDDENwith a message saying federation is disabled. That includes downloading media from another server that is not already cached here; media fetched before the switch went off is still served. - Events are still signed with the server key, and room and event IDs are unchanged. A room created while federation is off federates normally once it is switched on.
Federation over TLS
Other servers reach this one at whatever its server name resolves to: the
address in /.well-known/matrix/server, an SRV record, or the name itself
on port 8448. Two deployment shapes:
- Behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS — the usual one. Set
global.well_known.server_addressto the proxy'shost:443and leavelisten.federation_addressempty: the proxy forwards/_matrix/federationand/_matrix/keytolisten.addresslike everything else. - Warp terminates TLS itself: set
listen.federation_addressto:8448withlisten.tls_cert_fileandlisten.tls_key_file. The certificate must be valid for the server name (or for the delegated name, if the well-known document delegates).
Outbound federation verifies certificates against the system roots, plus
federation.tls_ca_file when it is set — for a private federation whose
servers share an internal CA. There is no switch to turn verification
off.