tajniak81andClaude Opus 5.5
92836f8dcd
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Implements PLAN.md Phase 6: the media repository. Clients upload files, reserve an mxc:// URI and upload to it later, download and ask for thumbnails, all through the authenticated media endpoints of Matrix 1.11; other servers download this server's media through the federation media endpoints, and media uploaded elsewhere is fetched over federation on first use and kept. internal/mediaapi is the component. Content goes into a BlobStore named by its SHA-256, so the same file uploaded twice is stored once and the hash doubles as the ETag; the metadata that maps an mxc:// URI onto a blob is in media_repository and media_thumbnails. The local-filesystem store writes to a temporary file and renames it into place once hashed, so nothing ever refers to half a file. A storage driver can bring its own store through storage.BlobProvider, which is where PocketBase's filesystem abstraction (local or S3) plugs in with Phase 10. Reserved uploads belong to the user who made them, take one upload, lapse after a day, and are capped per user; a download of one waits for its content, woken in memory the moment it arrives, for as long as timeout_ms allows. Thumbnails come from a fixed set of configured sizes, so a thousand requested sizes cannot mean a thousand resizes. They are made on first request and kept, never enlarge, honour a JPEG's EXIF orientation, and point at the original when it already fits. The pixel count is checked from the header before anything is decoded, at most four resizes run at once, and concurrent requests for the same thumbnail share one. Remote media is fetched through the signed client: the multipart/mixed answer of Matrix 1.11, with a fallback to the legacy download endpoint for servers that answer M_UNRECOGNIZED, and Location redirects followed by a dialer that refuses loopback, private and link-local addresses. Concurrent requests share one fetch, detached from the request that started it. With federation off nothing is fetched, and what was cached before is still served. Downloads carry a sandboxing CSP, nosniff, inline Content-Disposition only for the types the spec lists as safe, and private immutable caching. The unauthenticated legacy download endpoints are off by default behind media.legacy_unauthenticated_downloads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
3.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
76 lines
3.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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# Start Warp the way Complement needs it.
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#
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# There is no configuration file: every setting Warp has can come from a
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# WARP_* environment variable, so the whole deployment is the few lines
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# below. Complement may run this entrypoint more than once against the same
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# container, so everything here is idempotent.
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set -eu
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DATA_DIR="${WARP_DATA_DIR:-/data}"
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mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR"
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# Complement names the homeservers hs1, hs2, ... and passes the name in.
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export WARP_SERVER_NAME="${SERVER_NAME:-hs1}"
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export WARP_PRIVATE_KEY="$DATA_DIR/signing.key"
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export WARP_DB_DRIVER=sqlite
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export WARP_DB_CONNECTION_STRING="file:$DATA_DIR/warp.db?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=busy_timeout(10000)&_pragma=foreign_keys(1)"
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export WARP_DB_AUTO_MIGRATE=true
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export WARP_MEDIA_BASE_PATH="$DATA_DIR/media"
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export WARP_LISTEN_ADDRESS=":8008"
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# The suite registers and logs in constantly, all from the one address the
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# test runner has. Rate limiting would turn that into a wall of
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# M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED and tell us nothing about the server. Synapse's own
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# Complement image does the same.
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export WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=false
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# Open registration: the tests create their own users.
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export WARP_REGISTRATION_ENABLED=true
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# Federation stays off unless the profile asks for it: run.sh passes
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# WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED=true into the container for the federation
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# profile.
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export WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED="${WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED:-false}"
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# Federation over TLS on 8448. Complement mounts a CA at /complement/ca and
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# expects every homeserver of a run to present a certificate it signed;
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# the same CA is what Warp trusts when it connects to the others, and to
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# the servers Complement itself pretends to be.
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CA_DIR=/complement/ca
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if [ -f "$CA_DIR/ca.crt" ] && [ -f "$CA_DIR/ca.key" ]; then
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if [ ! -f "$DATA_DIR/tls.crt" ]; then
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openssl genrsa -out "$DATA_DIR/tls.key" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl req -new -sha256 -key "$DATA_DIR/tls.key" \
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-subj "/CN=$WARP_SERVER_NAME" -out "$DATA_DIR/tls.csr"
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printf 'subjectAltName=DNS:%s\n' "$WARP_SERVER_NAME" > "$DATA_DIR/san.ext"
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# The serial file goes in the data directory: the CA mount may be
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# read-only.
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openssl x509 -req -in "$DATA_DIR/tls.csr" \
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-CA "$CA_DIR/ca.crt" -CAkey "$CA_DIR/ca.key" \
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-CAserial "$DATA_DIR/ca.srl" -CAcreateserial \
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-out "$DATA_DIR/tls.crt" -days 1 -sha256 -extfile "$DATA_DIR/san.ext" 2>/dev/null
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fi
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export WARP_LISTEN_FEDERATION_ADDRESS=":8448"
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export WARP_TLS_CERT_FILE="$DATA_DIR/tls.crt"
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export WARP_TLS_KEY_FILE="$DATA_DIR/tls.key"
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export WARP_FEDERATION_TLS_CA_FILE="$CA_DIR/ca.crt"
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fi
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# Complement captures the container's output, so text at debug level is the
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# most useful thing to have when a test fails.
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export WARP_LOG_LEVEL="${WARP_LOG_LEVEL:-debug}"
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export WARP_LOG_FORMAT="${WARP_LOG_FORMAT:-text}"
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if [ ! -f "$WARP_PRIVATE_KEY" ]; then
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warp generate-keys --output "$WARP_PRIVATE_KEY"
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fi
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# Migrations also run on boot, but doing them here keeps a schema failure
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# out of the request path and makes it obvious in the container log.
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warp migrate
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exec warp serve
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