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Implements PLAN.md Phase 1. A client can now register, log in, manage its devices and set its profile; an operator can create accounts and flip the runtime switches. There are still no rooms and no real /sync. userapi: accounts, argon2id passwords in PHC format, devices, access and refresh tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes, account data and the admin flag. Its storage interface is storage.UserStore, implemented once in sqlstore with `?` placeholders; the postgres driver supplies a rebind function and unique-violation recognition rather than keeping a second copy of thirty statements. Timestamps in these tables are int64 milliseconds, the unit the Client-Server API uses on the wire. Client-Server API: register (user-interactive auth with m.login.dummy and optional registration tokens), register/available, token validity, login with m.login.password, logout, logout/all, refresh, account/whoami, capabilities, devices/* with password-gated deletion, profile/*, global and per-room account data. GET /sync is a deliberate placeholder: it answers a valid token with an empty but well-formed response and refuses a revoked one. Phase 1 has no rooms, so that is the whole truth, and it is what makes session revocation observable. Phase 4 replaces it with the syncapi. Auth middleware resolves a bearer token (header or the legacy query parameter) to a device and user, answering an expired token with the soft logout the spec asks for. Rate limiting is a token bucket per endpoint class keyed on the client address, returning M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED with retry_after_ms. adminapi v1 under /_warp/admin/v1: admin-only auth via a normal Matrix token, GET/PUT /federation and /registration driving internal/settings and reporting a config-pinned switch as a 409, GET/POST /users, GET /stats. warp create-account [--admin] creates the first account straight in the database, so a new install with registration off has a way in. Complement is wired up for the federation=off profile: an image meeting its contract, an entrypoint that configures Warp entirely from WARP_* variables, and a runner that builds, clones and executes the target set (TestRegistration, TestLogin, TestDeviceManagement). It has not been run yet -- there is no container runtime on the development machine -- so the three tests' assertions were read from the Complement sources and pinned as httptest tests instead, and CI gained a job that runs the real thing. Also fixes a .gitignore bug from Phase 0: the unanchored `warp` pattern, meant for the built binary, also matched the directory server/cmd/warp and silently excluded the entire command package from the repository. The binary patterns are now anchored to the repository root, and cmd/warp is committed for the first time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
166 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
166 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package ratelimit
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// clock is a hand-wound clock, so the tests do not sleep.
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type clock struct{ at time.Time }
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func (c *clock) now() time.Time { return c.at }
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func (c *clock) add(d time.Duration) { c.at = c.at.Add(d) }
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func newTestLimiter(policy Policy) (*Limiter, *clock) {
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c := &clock{at: time.Date(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
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l := New(policy)
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l.now = c.now
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return l, c
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}
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func TestLimiterAllowsBurstThenRefills(t *testing.T) {
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l, c := newTestLimiter(Policy{Burst: 3, Interval: time.Second})
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for i := range 3 {
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("request %d of the burst was limited (wait %v)", i+1, wait)
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}
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}
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wait := l.Allow("alice")
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if wait <= 0 {
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t.Fatal("the fourth request should have been limited")
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}
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if wait != time.Second {
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t.Errorf("retry after = %v, want 1s (one interval)", wait)
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}
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// Half an interval is not enough for a slot to come back.
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c.add(500 * time.Millisecond)
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 500*time.Millisecond {
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t.Errorf("retry after half an interval = %v, want 500ms", wait)
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}
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c.add(500 * time.Millisecond)
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 0 {
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t.Errorf("a slot should have come back after one interval, got wait %v", wait)
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}
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}
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func TestLimiterKeysAreIndependent(t *testing.T) {
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l, _ := newTestLimiter(Policy{Burst: 1, Interval: time.Second})
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("alice was limited straight away: %v", wait)
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}
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait == 0 {
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t.Fatal("alice should be out of budget")
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}
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if wait := l.Allow("bob"); wait != 0 {
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t.Errorf("bob was limited by alice's traffic: %v", wait)
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}
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}
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func TestLimiterRecoversFullyWhenIdle(t *testing.T) {
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l, c := newTestLimiter(Policy{Burst: 2, Interval: time.Second})
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l.Allow("alice")
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l.Allow("alice")
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c.add(time.Hour)
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for i := range 2 {
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 0 {
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t.Errorf("after an idle hour, request %d was limited: %v", i+1, wait)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestLimiterSweepsIdleBuckets(t *testing.T) {
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l, c := newTestLimiter(Policy{Burst: 1, Interval: time.Second})
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l.Allow("alice")
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c.add(sweepInterval + time.Second)
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// This call triggers the sweep, which must drop alice's long-full bucket
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// rather than keeping one entry per address that ever connected.
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l.Allow("bob")
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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if _, present := l.fullAt["alice"]; present {
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t.Error("an idle bucket survived the sweep")
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}
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if _, present := l.fullAt["bob"]; !present {
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t.Error("the active bucket was swept away")
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}
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}
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func TestDisabledLimiterAllowsEverything(t *testing.T) {
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for name, l := range map[string]*Limiter{
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"explicitly disabled": Disabled(),
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"zero burst": New(Policy{Burst: 0, Interval: time.Second}),
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"zero interval": New(Policy{Burst: 10, Interval: 0}),
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} {
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t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
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for range 100 {
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if wait := l.Allow("alice"); wait != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("a disabled limiter limited a request: %v", wait)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestMiddlewareReturnsLimitExceeded(t *testing.T) {
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l, _ := newTestLimiter(Policy{Burst: 1, Interval: 1500 * time.Millisecond})
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handler := l.Middleware(ClientIP(false))(http.HandlerFunc(
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func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) }))
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call := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/_matrix/client/v3/login", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.0.2.10:1234"
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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return rec
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}
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if rec := call(); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("first request status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
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}
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rec := call()
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if rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("second request status = %d, want 429", rec.Code)
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}
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if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
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t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
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}
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body := rec.Body.String()
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for _, want := range []string{`"errcode":"M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"`, `"retry_after_ms":1500`} {
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if !strings.Contains(body, want) {
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t.Errorf("body %s is missing %s", body, want)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestClientIPUsesForwardedForOnlyWhenTrusted(t *testing.T) {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "192.0.2.10:1234"
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.7, 192.0.2.1")
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if got := ClientIP(false)(req); got != "192.0.2.10" {
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t.Errorf("untrusted X-Forwarded-For was used: key = %q", got)
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}
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if got := ClientIP(true)(req); got != "203.0.113.7" {
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t.Errorf("trusted X-Forwarded-For key = %q, want the left-most entry", got)
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}
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// A request without the header falls back to the socket either way.
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req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-For")
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if got := ClientIP(true)(req); got != "192.0.2.10" {
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t.Errorf("key without the header = %q, want the socket address", got)
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}
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}
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