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Implements PLAN.md Phase 3: the roomserver, the room half of storage, the Client-Server room endpoints and the admin room endpoints. A client can now create a room, invite, join, leave, kick, ban, send messages and state, redact, name a room with an alias and find one in the public directory. Nothing talks to another server; every operation that would need to is refused with a message that says so rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN. roomserver: one input pipeline every event goes through, whatever sent it — validate, authorise, resolve, persist, emit. The rules are not reimplemented here; internal/matrix is pure library code and this is what connects it to a database and to a room's history. The Client-Server handlers do no authorisation of their own, deliberately: whether Alice may kick Bob is a question about the room's power levels, and the one place that is answered correctly is the authorisation rules inside the pipeline. A mutex per room serialises writers. Two events racing into one room would each read the same forward extremities, both become one, and fork the room for no reason — which would then need state resolution to put back together. State resolution is wired in anyway for the multi-extremity case. It is unreachable from outside in this phase, and the alternative is a pipeline that authorises against one arbitrary branch of a fork without saying so. Room versions 3 to 12 all work and are each tested end to end. Version 12 earns that coverage: its room ID is the create event's own ID, its create event carries no room_id, and the create event is excluded from every other event's auth_events — so the state auth.Check is given is the event's auth_events plus the create event, which that version identifies by room ID rather than citing. createRoom sends the spec's events in the spec's order, each authorised against what the ones before it produced. A failure part-way leaves an incomplete room, which is the lesser evil: the alternative is holding every event of a new room in memory and writing them in one transaction, making the pipeline that authorises them a special case. The one failure a second client can cause at any time, an alias clash, takes the room row back out. Redactions stay two decisions, as the spec keeps them. The rules let almost any redaction into the room; whether it applies to its target is a separate test, run inside the same transaction as the redaction itself so that a client holding an event ID can always read the stripped event. storage: events keyed by event ID rather than by a surrogate, since an event ID appears in prev_events, auth_events, state snapshots and client requests alike. Stream ordering comes from a counter row bumped inside the write transaction, because a PostgreSQL sequence is explicitly not transactional and a rolled-back write would leave a hole in the stream that /sync would have to be taught to skip. State snapshots are stored per event and deduplicated by content hash, so the table grows with state changes rather than with traffic — and that is what makes "the state after a forward extremity" answerable at all. The room's listing columns are denormalised onto its row because the public directory orders every published room by member count and pages the result, which cannot be done by reading each room's state in turn. Federation-disabled behaviour from PLAN.md section 3 is enforced here. Restricted joins are the exception that works: the rule needs a signature from the authorising user's server verified, and while federation is off that server is always this one. adminapi: room list and detail, purge, force-leave, and room and event counters on the dashboard. clientapi gains its own rate-limit buckets for createRoom and for joining, both of which write events rather than read them. Tested against the real event core and a real database rather than fakes: what is under test is whether an event this server signs is one the authorisation rules accept, and a fake of either would only prove that the pipeline calls what the fake expects. The storage tests run against both SQL drivers. docs/rooms.md describes the pipeline, the storage decisions and the known gaps — chief among them that history visibility is room-level rather than per-event, and that /sync still reports no rooms, both of which belong with the event stream in Phase 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
166 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
166 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
// Package httputil holds the HTTP plumbing shared by every Warp API: the
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// Matrix error envelope, JSON helpers, CORS and middleware.
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package httputil
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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)
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// Matrix error codes used so far. The full list lives in the Client-Server
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// API spec, section "Standard error response"; codes are added as the
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// endpoints that return them are implemented.
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const (
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ErrCodeForbidden = "M_FORBIDDEN"
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ErrCodeUnknownToken = "M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN"
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ErrCodeMissingToken = "M_MISSING_TOKEN"
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ErrCodeBadJSON = "M_BAD_JSON"
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ErrCodeNotJSON = "M_NOT_JSON"
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ErrCodeNotFound = "M_NOT_FOUND"
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ErrCodeLimitExceeded = "M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"
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ErrCodeUnknown = "M_UNKNOWN"
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ErrCodeUnrecognized = "M_UNRECOGNIZED"
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ErrCodeUnauthorized = "M_UNAUTHORIZED"
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ErrCodeMissingParam = "M_MISSING_PARAM"
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ErrCodeInvalidParam = "M_INVALID_PARAM"
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ErrCodeTooLarge = "M_TOO_LARGE"
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ErrCodeUnsupportedVer = "M_UNSUPPORTED_ROOM_VERSION"
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// Room codes, added with the roomserver in Phase 3.
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ErrCodeRoomInUse = "M_ROOM_IN_USE"
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// Account and session codes, added with the userapi in Phase 1.
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ErrCodeUserInUse = "M_USER_IN_USE"
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ErrCodeInvalidUsername = "M_INVALID_USERNAME"
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ErrCodeUserDeactivated = "M_USER_DEACTIVATED"
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ErrCodeExclusive = "M_EXCLUSIVE"
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ErrCodeWeakPassword = "M_WEAK_PASSWORD"
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)
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// MatrixError is the standard Matrix error envelope. Every non-2xx response
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// from a /_matrix endpoint is one of these, serialised as
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//
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// {"errcode": "M_FORBIDDEN", "error": "..."}
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//
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// It implements error so handlers can return it up the stack.
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type MatrixError struct {
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Code string `json:"errcode"`
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Message string `json:"error"`
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// RetryAfterMS accompanies M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
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RetryAfterMS int64 `json:"retry_after_ms,omitempty"`
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// SoftLogout accompanies M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN when the client may keep its
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// encryption state and re-login.
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SoftLogout bool `json:"soft_logout,omitempty"`
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// status is the HTTP status to send; not part of the JSON body.
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status int
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}
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func (e *MatrixError) Error() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", e.Code, e.Message)
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}
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// StatusCode is the HTTP status this error is sent with.
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func (e *MatrixError) StatusCode() int {
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if e.status == 0 {
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return http.StatusInternalServerError
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}
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return e.status
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}
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// NewError builds an arbitrary Matrix error.
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func NewError(status int, code, format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return &MatrixError{Code: code, Message: fmt.Sprintf(format, args...), status: status}
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}
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// Forbidden is M_FORBIDDEN (403). Federation-disabled rejections use it.
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func Forbidden(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusForbidden, ErrCodeForbidden, format, args...)
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}
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// NotFound is M_NOT_FOUND (404) for a resource that could exist but does not.
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func NotFound(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusNotFound, ErrCodeNotFound, format, args...)
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}
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// Unrecognized is M_UNRECOGNIZED (404), the spec's answer for an endpoint
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// this server does not implement at all.
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func Unrecognized() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusNotFound, ErrCodeUnrecognized, "Unrecognized request")
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}
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// MethodNotAllowed is M_UNRECOGNIZED (405) for a known path, wrong verb.
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func MethodNotAllowed() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, ErrCodeUnrecognized, "Unrecognized request")
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}
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// NotJSON is M_NOT_JSON (400): the body was not valid JSON at all.
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func NotJSON() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeNotJSON, "Content not JSON")
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}
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// BadJSON is M_BAD_JSON (400): valid JSON, wrong shape.
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func BadJSON(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeBadJSON, format, args...)
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}
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// MissingParam is M_MISSING_PARAM (400).
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func MissingParam(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeMissingParam, format, args...)
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}
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// InvalidParam is M_INVALID_PARAM (400).
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func InvalidParam(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeInvalidParam, format, args...)
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}
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// MissingToken is M_MISSING_TOKEN (401).
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func MissingToken() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusUnauthorized, ErrCodeMissingToken, "Missing access token")
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}
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// UnknownToken is M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN (401).
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func UnknownToken(softLogout bool) *MatrixError {
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err := NewError(http.StatusUnauthorized, ErrCodeUnknownToken, "Unrecognised access token")
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err.SoftLogout = softLogout
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return err
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}
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// LimitExceeded is M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED (429).
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func LimitExceeded(retryAfterMS int64) *MatrixError {
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err := NewError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, ErrCodeLimitExceeded, "Too many requests")
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err.RetryAfterMS = retryAfterMS
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return err
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}
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// InternalError is M_UNKNOWN (500). The message is deliberately vague: the
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// detail belongs in the log, not in the response.
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func InternalError() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusInternalServerError, ErrCodeUnknown, "Internal server error")
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}
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// UserInUse is M_USER_IN_USE (400): the requested user name is taken.
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func UserInUse() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeUserInUse, "Desired user ID is already taken")
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}
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// InvalidUsername is M_INVALID_USERNAME (400): the user name is not usable,
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// either because of its characters or its length.
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func InvalidUsername(format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, ErrCodeInvalidUsername, format, args...)
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}
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// UserDeactivated is M_USER_DEACTIVATED (403).
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func UserDeactivated() *MatrixError {
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return NewError(http.StatusForbidden, ErrCodeUserDeactivated, "This account has been deactivated")
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}
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// Unknown is M_UNKNOWN with an explicit status, for the handful of cases the
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// spec answers with that code rather than a specific one — an unsupported
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// login type, for instance.
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func Unknown(status int, format string, args ...any) *MatrixError {
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return NewError(status, ErrCodeUnknown, format, args...)
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}
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