Files
Warp/server/internal/roomserver/membership.go
T
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 c96f88e994
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Phase 3: rooms, local only
Implements PLAN.md Phase 3: the roomserver, the room half of storage, the
Client-Server room endpoints and the admin room endpoints. A client can now
create a room, invite, join, leave, kick, ban, send messages and state,
redact, name a room with an alias and find one in the public directory.
Nothing talks to another server; every operation that would need to is
refused with a message that says so rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN.

roomserver: one input pipeline every event goes through, whatever sent it —
validate, authorise, resolve, persist, emit. The rules are not
reimplemented here; internal/matrix is pure library code and this is what
connects it to a database and to a room's history. The Client-Server
handlers do no authorisation of their own, deliberately: whether Alice may
kick Bob is a question about the room's power levels, and the one place
that is answered correctly is the authorisation rules inside the pipeline.

A mutex per room serialises writers. Two events racing into one room would
each read the same forward extremities, both become one, and fork the room
for no reason — which would then need state resolution to put back
together. State resolution is wired in anyway for the multi-extremity
case. It is unreachable from outside in this phase, and the alternative is
a pipeline that authorises against one arbitrary branch of a fork without
saying so.

Room versions 3 to 12 all work and are each tested end to end. Version 12
earns that coverage: its room ID is the create event's own ID, its create
event carries no room_id, and the create event is excluded from every other
event's auth_events — so the state auth.Check is given is the event's
auth_events plus the create event, which that version identifies by room ID
rather than citing.

createRoom sends the spec's events in the spec's order, each authorised
against what the ones before it produced. A failure part-way leaves an
incomplete room, which is the lesser evil: the alternative is holding every
event of a new room in memory and writing them in one transaction, making
the pipeline that authorises them a special case. The one failure a second
client can cause at any time, an alias clash, takes the room row back out.

Redactions stay two decisions, as the spec keeps them. The rules let almost
any redaction into the room; whether it applies to its target is a separate
test, run inside the same transaction as the redaction itself so that a
client holding an event ID can always read the stripped event.

storage: events keyed by event ID rather than by a surrogate, since an
event ID appears in prev_events, auth_events, state snapshots and client
requests alike. Stream ordering comes from a counter row bumped inside the
write transaction, because a PostgreSQL sequence is explicitly not
transactional and a rolled-back write would leave a hole in the stream that
/sync would have to be taught to skip. State snapshots are stored per event
and deduplicated by content hash, so the table grows with state changes
rather than with traffic — and that is what makes "the state after a
forward extremity" answerable at all. The room's listing columns are
denormalised onto its row because the public directory orders every
published room by member count and pages the result, which cannot be done
by reading each room's state in turn.

Federation-disabled behaviour from PLAN.md section 3 is enforced here.
Restricted joins are the exception that works: the rule needs a signature
from the authorising user's server verified, and while federation is off
that server is always this one.

adminapi: room list and detail, purge, force-leave, and room and event
counters on the dashboard. clientapi gains its own rate-limit buckets for
createRoom and for joining, both of which write events rather than read
them.

Tested against the real event core and a real database rather than fakes:
what is under test is whether an event this server signs is one the
authorisation rules accept, and a fake of either would only prove that the
pipeline calls what the fake expects. The storage tests run against both
SQL drivers. docs/rooms.md describes the pipeline, the storage decisions
and the known gaps — chief among them that history visibility is
room-level rather than per-event, and that /sync still reports no rooms,
both of which belong with the event stream in Phase 4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 10:34:57 +02:00

460 lines
15 KiB
Go

package roomserver
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/auth"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/event"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/matrix/id"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/storage"
)
// JoinRequest asks to join a room.
type JoinRequest struct {
// RoomID is the room to join. The caller has already resolved an alias.
RoomID string
// User is the full user ID joining.
User string
// Reason is an optional note put in the membership event.
Reason string
// ServerNames are the ?server_name= hints a client sends for a room its
// own server may not know. They are only usable over federation, and
// their presence for a room this server does not have is what turns a
// join into a federated one.
ServerNames []string
}
// JoinRoom joins a local room.
//
// Joining a room this server does not have is a federated join: the whole
// room has to be fetched from a server that does have it, which is Phase 5.
// While federation is off that is refused with a message saying so, which is
// the behaviour PLAN.md section 3 asks for — a client otherwise sees a bare
// M_FORBIDDEN and the operator goes looking through power levels.
func (r *API) JoinRoom(ctx context.Context, req JoinRequest) (string, error) {
if !r.isLocal(req.User) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not a user of this server", ErrForbidden, req.User)
}
switch _, err := r.store.Room(ctx, req.RoomID); {
case errors.Is(err, ErrNoSuchRoom):
if !r.federationEnabled() {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not a room on this server, and joining a remote room",
ErrFederationDisabled, req.RoomID)
}
// With federation on, a room we do not have still has to be
// fetched from a server that does. That is Phase 5.
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: joining a room this server does not have is not implemented yet",
ErrFederationDisabled)
case err != nil:
return "", err
}
// Joining a room you are already in is a no-op rather than a second
// event: clients call /join to make sure, and every extra membership
// event would show up in everybody's timeline.
membership, err := r.store.Membership(ctx, req.RoomID, req.User)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if membership.Membership == event.MembershipJoin {
return req.RoomID, nil
}
content, err := r.joinContent(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if _, err := r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: req.RoomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(req.User),
Sender: req.User,
Content: content,
}); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return req.RoomID, nil
}
// joinContent builds the m.room.member content of a join, including the
// authorisation a restricted room needs.
func (r *API) joinContent(ctx context.Context, req JoinRequest) (json.RawMessage, error) {
content := r.membershipContentMap(ctx, event.MembershipJoin, req.User, req.Reason, false)
authorisedVia, err := r.restrictedJoinAuthoriser(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if authorisedVia != "" {
content["join_authorised_via_users_server"] = authorisedVia
}
return mustMarshal(content), nil
}
// restrictedJoinAuthoriser finds a local user who can authorise a join
// under the restricted join rule, or returns "" when the rule does not
// apply.
//
// The restricted join rule lets membership of another room stand in for an
// invite, but somebody has to attest that the joining user really is in one
// of the allowed rooms. That attestation is a signature from the authorising
// user's server over the membership event, so the authoriser has to be a
// user this server can sign for and who has the power to invite. While
// federation is off every room is local, so this server can always see the
// allowed rooms itself.
func (r *API) restrictedJoinAuthoriser(ctx context.Context, req JoinRequest) (string, error) {
room, err := r.store.Room(ctx, req.RoomID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
rules, err := r.rules(room)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if !rules.RestrictedJoinRule {
return "", nil
}
st, err := r.currentState(ctx, room, rules)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
switch st.JoinRule() {
case auth.JoinRuleRestricted:
case auth.JoinRuleKnockRestricted:
if !rules.KnockRestrictedJoinRule {
return "", nil
}
default:
return "", nil
}
// An invited user joins on the invite, with no authorisation needed,
// and the rules check the invite first.
if st.Membership(req.User) == event.MembershipInvite {
return "", nil
}
allowed, err := allowedRooms(st)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
inAnAllowedRoom := false
for _, allowedRoom := range allowed {
membership, err := r.store.Membership(ctx, allowedRoom, req.User)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if membership.Membership == event.MembershipJoin {
inAnAllowedRoom = true
break
}
}
if !inAnAllowedRoom {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not joined to any room that grants entry to %s",
ErrForbidden, req.User, req.RoomID)
}
return r.localUserWhoCanInvite(st, req.RoomID)
}
// allowedRooms reads the room IDs an m.room.join_rules event grants entry
// through.
func allowedRooms(st auth.State) ([]string, error) {
joinRules := st.JoinRules()
if joinRules == nil {
return nil, nil
}
var content struct {
Allow []struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
RoomID string `json:"room_id"`
} `json:"allow"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(joinRules.Content(), &content); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: the room's join rules are unreadable: %v", ErrRejected, err)
}
var out []string
for _, entry := range content.Allow {
// "m.room_membership" is the only rule type the spec defines; an
// unknown one grants nothing rather than everything.
if entry.Type == "m.room_membership" && entry.RoomID != "" {
out = append(out, entry.RoomID)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// localUserWhoCanInvite picks a joined local user with the power to invite,
// to authorise a restricted join.
//
// Which user it is does not matter to the rules — only that they are in the
// room, can invite, and belong to a server that will sign for them. The
// room's creators come first because they always qualify.
func (r *API) localUserWhoCanInvite(st auth.State, roomID string) (string, error) {
create := st.Create()
if create == nil {
// A room with no create event in its current state is corrupt, and
// nothing here can judge anything about it.
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s has no create event in its state", ErrRejected, roomID)
}
powerLevels, err := auth.ResolvePowerLevels(st.PowerLevels(), create, create.Rules())
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrRejected, err)
}
creators, err := auth.Creators(create)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrRejected, err)
}
for _, creator := range creators {
if r.isLocal(creator) && st.Membership(creator) == event.MembershipJoin {
return creator, nil
}
}
for key, member := range st {
if key.Type != event.TypeMember || !r.isLocal(key.StateKey) {
continue
}
if membership, err := member.Membership(); err != nil || membership != event.MembershipJoin {
continue
}
if powerLevels.UserLevel(key.StateKey) >= powerLevels.Invite {
return key.StateKey, nil
}
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: no user of this server in %s can authorise a restricted join",
ErrForbidden, roomID)
}
// LeaveRoom leaves a room, or rejects an invite to one.
//
// Both are the same event: an m.room.member with membership "leave" sent by
// the user themselves. Whether they were joined, invited or knocking is the
// authorisation rules' business, and a user who was never in the room is
// refused by them.
func (r *API) LeaveRoom(ctx context.Context, roomID, userID, reason string) error {
_, err := r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: roomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(userID),
Sender: userID,
Content: r.membershipContent(ctx, event.MembershipLeave, userID, reason, false),
})
return err
}
// InviteRequest asks to invite a user to a room.
type InviteRequest struct {
RoomID string
// Sender is the full user ID doing the inviting.
Sender string
// Target is the full user ID being invited.
Target string
Reason string
// IsDirect marks the invite as a direct chat.
IsDirect bool
}
// InviteUser invites a user to a room.
//
// Inviting a user of another server means asking that server to
// countersign the invite, which needs federation. With it off the invite is
// refused with a message that says why rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN —
// PLAN.md section 3.
func (r *API) InviteUser(ctx context.Context, req InviteRequest) error {
if err := validateUserID(req.Target); err != nil {
return err
}
if !r.isLocal(req.Target) {
if !r.federationEnabled() {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is on another server, and inviting a remote user",
ErrFederationDisabled, req.Target)
}
return fmt.Errorf("%w: inviting a user of another server is not implemented yet",
ErrFederationDisabled)
}
_, err := r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: req.RoomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(req.Target),
Sender: req.Sender,
Content: r.membershipContent(ctx, event.MembershipInvite, req.Target, req.Reason, req.IsDirect),
})
return err
}
// KickUser removes a user from a room without barring them from returning.
//
// A kick is a membership change to "leave" made by somebody other than the
// user. It works on an invited or knocking user too, which is how an invite
// is withdrawn or a knock refused.
//
// A target who is not in the room at all is refused here rather than by the
// rules, which would accept a "leave" over a "leave" and add an event to
// the room that says nothing — and that every member would then see in
// their timeline. Lifting a ban is /unban, not a kick.
func (r *API) KickUser(ctx context.Context, roomID, sender, target, reason string) error {
if err := validateUserID(target); err != nil {
return err
}
membership, err := r.store.Membership(ctx, roomID, target)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch membership.Membership {
case event.MembershipJoin, event.MembershipInvite, event.MembershipKnock:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not in %s", ErrForbidden, target, roomID)
}
_, err = r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: roomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(target),
Sender: sender,
Content: r.membershipContent(ctx, event.MembershipLeave, target, reason, false),
})
return err
}
// BanUser bars a user from a room.
func (r *API) BanUser(ctx context.Context, roomID, sender, target, reason string) error {
if err := validateUserID(target); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err := r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: roomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(target),
Sender: sender,
Content: r.membershipContent(ctx, event.MembershipBan, target, reason, false),
})
return err
}
// UnbanUser lifts a ban, which leaves the user outside the room rather than
// in it.
func (r *API) UnbanUser(ctx context.Context, roomID, sender, target, reason string) error {
if err := validateUserID(target); err != nil {
return err
}
// Unbanning someone who is not banned is refused here rather than by
// the rules, which would happily accept a "leave" over a "leave" and
// produce an event that says nothing.
membership, err := r.store.Membership(ctx, roomID, target)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if membership.Membership != event.MembershipBan {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not banned from %s", ErrForbidden, target, roomID)
}
_, err = r.send(ctx, sendRequest{
RoomID: roomID,
Type: event.TypeMember,
StateKey: statePtr(target),
Sender: sender,
Content: r.membershipContent(ctx, event.MembershipLeave, target, reason, false),
})
return err
}
// ForceLeave makes a user leave a room without any authorisation check,
// for the admin API.
//
// It is still an ordinary membership event, signed and added to the room,
// so the other members see what happened. What it skips is only the
// question of whether the user was allowed to leave — a user stuck in a
// broken room is the case this exists for, and in a broken room the rules
// are exactly what is in the way.
func (r *API) ForceLeave(ctx context.Context, roomID, userID string) error {
membership, err := r.store.Membership(ctx, roomID, userID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch membership.Membership {
case event.MembershipJoin, event.MembershipInvite, event.MembershipKnock:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not in %s", ErrForbidden, userID, roomID)
}
return r.LeaveRoom(ctx, roomID, userID, "Removed by a server administrator")
}
// membershipContent builds an m.room.member content.
func (r *API) membershipContent(ctx context.Context, membership, userID, reason string, isDirect bool) json.RawMessage {
return mustMarshal(r.membershipContentMap(ctx, membership, userID, reason, isDirect))
}
// membershipContentMap is membershipContent before encoding, so that a
// restricted join can add its authorisation to it.
//
// The profile is copied into the event on purpose: a client rendering a
// room's history has to show the name the member had at the time, and the
// membership event is the only record of it. A profile that cannot be read
// is left out rather than failing the membership change — being unable to
// join a room because the display name lookup failed would be the wrong
// trade.
func (r *API) membershipContentMap(ctx context.Context, membership, userID, reason string, isDirect bool) map[string]any {
content := map[string]any{"membership": membership}
if reason != "" {
content["reason"] = reason
}
if isDirect {
content["is_direct"] = true
}
// A ban or a kick says nothing about the target's profile: the event is
// about the sender's decision, and copying a display name into it would
// only give a moderator a way to write into somebody else's membership.
if membership != event.MembershipJoin && membership != event.MembershipInvite {
return content
}
if r.profiles == nil {
return content
}
localpart, ok := r.localpartOf(userID)
if !ok {
return content
}
account, err := r.profiles.Account(ctx, localpart)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNoSuchUser) {
r.log.Warn("could not read a profile for a membership event",
"user_id", userID, "error", err)
}
return content
}
if account.DisplayName != "" {
content["displayname"] = account.DisplayName
}
if account.AvatarURL != "" {
content["avatar_url"] = account.AvatarURL
}
return content
}
// validateUserID checks a user ID arriving from a client against the
// grammar events use, which is laxer than the one this server's own
// accounts are held to: a room can contain user IDs minted years ago.
func validateUserID(userID string) error {
if err := id.ValidateUserID(userID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidContent, err)
}
return nil
}